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EVALUATING ORIGINALISM: 
COMMERCE AND EMOLUMENTS 
JOHN VLAHOPLUS† 
  INTRODUCTION  
The debates among originalists and between them and their 
critics have continued unabated since Paul Brest, H. Jefferson 
Powell, and others rebutted original intent originalism in  
the 1980s.1  Critics claim victory, arguing that none of the many 
originalist theories is conceptually sound,2 normatively 
attractive,3 consistent with the others,4 or accurate as a 
description of American constitutional practice.5  Originalism is 
merely “a collection of rapidly evolving theories, constantly 
reshaping themselves in profound ways in response to devastating 
critiques, and not infrequently splintering further into multiple, 
mutually exclusive iterations. . . . The very notion of originalism 
itself has become indeterminate.”6  Originalism is not a 
jurisprudential doctrine, but rather a political practice designed to 
achieve specific ends through the dubious claim that its historical 
authenticity transcends political disputes.7  Originalists respond 
 
† B.A., Washington & Lee University; J.D., Harvard Law School; D.Phil., Oxford 
University; Member, New York State Bar. Thanks to Gary Lawson, Robert G. 
Natelson, Lawrence B. Solum, Seth Barrett Tillman, Phoebe Vlahoplus, and the 
editors of the St. John’s Law Review. 
1 See, e.g., Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L. J. 
239, 243–44 (2009) (ongoing debates among originalists and between them and 
critics); Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. 
L. REV. 204, 205 (1980); H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original 
Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 885 (1985). 
2 See, e.g., Colby & Smith, supra note 1, at 244. 
3 See, e.g., Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1, 2 (asserting that “[t]extualism is . . . normatively unattractive” if it asserts 
real differences from purposivism). 
4 See, e.g., Colby & Smith, supra note 1, at 245–46. 
5 See, e.g., Stephen M. Griffin, Rebooting Originalism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1185, 
1195 (2008); Brest, supra note 1, at 231–32; Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 
84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 34, 36 (2009). 
6 Colby & Smith, supra note 1, at 245–46. 
7 Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Originalism as a Political Practice: The Right’s 
Living Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545, 561 (2006). 
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that competing pluralist theories are indeterminate, arbitrary, 
unattractive, and mutually inconsistent.8  They claim victory 
despite the force of critical attacks, arguing that originalism 
prevails in practice even though no one has written “a definitive 
formulation of originalism or a definitive refutation of its critics.”9 
Other scholars argue that the contestants are merely “talking 
past one another,”10 emphasizing minor points of difference at the 
expense of general agreement on fundamental issues.11  They 
conclude that we have reached a “strong consensus on the 
interpretive enterprise” and should now “engage in a more 
productive dialogue regarding the narrow differences that 
remain.”12 
This Article suggests that originalist theories share a core 
focus that meaningfully competes with pluralist theories.  The 
contest is real and appears in centuries of debates within 
Anglo-American and civil law.  The Article locates the 
Anglo-American origins of originalism in a novel 
seventeenth-century method of legal interpretation used to 
achieve a specific political end:  to stifle opposition to the union of 
Scottish and English subjects of King James after his accession to 
the English crown in 1603.  It details the novel method and the 
competing traditional method of English legal interpretation.  It 
then evaluates originalist interpretations of the Commerce and 
Emoluments Clauses of the Constitution in light of the two 
competing methods. 
 
8 See, e.g., Christopher R. Green, “This Constitution”: Constitutional Indexicals as 
a Basis for Textualist Semi-Originalism, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1607, 1617 n.21 
(2009) (criticizing theories that utilize multiple modes of constitutional discourse as 
indeterminate or ultimately reliant on the supremacy of the interpreter rather than 
the Constitution); Colby & Smith, supra note 1, at 241 (Justice Scalia: critics cannot 
agree on anything except that originalism is wrong); Randy E. Barnett, An 
Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 617 (1999) (“It takes a theory to 
beat a theory,” and critics of originalism have not agreed on “an appealing and 
practical alternative”). 
9 Barnett, supra note 8, at 613. 
10 See Molot, supra note 3, at 2; cf. Berman, supra note 5, at 4 (questioning 
whether “self-professed originalists champion a version of originalism that their 
critics don’t reject, and that the critics challenge a version the proponents don’t 
maintain,” but concluding that originalist efforts have failed and have slim prospects 
for future success). 
11 See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of Historical  
Fact in Original Meaning, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 9 (2015) (noting widespread 
agreement on ecumenical originalism). 
12 See Molot, supra note 3, at 2. 
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Part I provides a brief introduction to the core of originalism 
and its criticisms of pluralism.  Part II sets out the novel 
seventeenth-century method of interpretation.  Part III details the 
traditional pluralist method of English legal interpretation and its 
critique of the novel theory.  Part IV suggests that the competing 
English approaches anticipated many of the major points that 
originalists and their critics debate today.  Part V evaluates 
originalist interpretations of the Commerce Clause.  Part VI 
evaluates originalist interpretations of the Emoluments Clauses 
in the context of President Trump’s business activities, with 
special attention to Anglo-American legal history proximate to the 
adoption of the Constitution that characterized the benefits of 
government contracts as emoluments that threaten public trust 
and the survival of representative government.  Part VII considers 
the implications of the evaluations for originalism. 
This Article concludes that the core of originalism is 
normative, not descriptive.  It continues to face the same 
challenges that it has throughout history.  It has survived for 
centuries because it is normative, and its proponents are unlikely 
to yield to theoretical arguments any time soon. 
I. ORIGINALISM: A BRIEF INTRODUCTION 
“Originalism” is a family of interpretive theories that 
generally share two features: an acute focus on history and an 
aversion to allowing judges the discretion to apply personal or 
contemporary values when interpreting constitutional text.13  
 
13 For a summary of the literature on point, see Colby & Smith, supra note 1, at 
288 n.225. See also Solum, supra note 11, at 6–8 (describing originalism as a family of 
theories, most of which consider legal facts to constrain adjudication); id. at 59 
(asserting that even if constitutional terms like “equal” have essential moral 
meanings, some originalists would oppose interpreting them as such); Stephen E. 
Sachs, Originalism as a Theory of Legal Change, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 817, 845 
(2015) (“Originalism starts by assigning the legal system an origin, namely the 
Founding. That means it accepts the law as it stood at the Founding, regardless of 
how it got that way.”); Colby & Smith, supra note 1, at 243, 279; Barnett, supra  
note 8, at 636, 641–42; Green, supra note 8, at 1624, 1658, 1662; Michael Stokes 
Paulsen, Does the Constitution Prescribe Rules for Its Own Interpretation?, 103 NW. 
U. L. REV. 857, 859 (2009) (“[A]nachronistic readings would decisively undermine the 
Constitution as a written, authoritative, binding, and exclusive document.”); id. at 
878–79 (attacking the technique of identifying an abstract principle in the 
Constitution, assigning it a specific content based on the interpreter’s own 
discernment, then infusing that content into particular constitutional provisions); 
Matthew J. Franck, Re: Anti-Federalist Society, NAT’L REV. (Aug. 8, 2005, 3:43 PM), 
https://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/re-anti-federalist-society-matthew-j-
franck/ (noting that Federalist Society members are “united by little else than a 
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Originalists use a variety of techniques to tie constitutional 
interpretation to the past, including textualism,14 strict 
construction,15 rules of grammar,16 dictionary definitions17 and 
etymologies18 recorded proximate to adoption, and the publicly 
expressed intent of the drafters or ratifiers.19  In particular, many 
originalists argue that the writtenness of constitutional text 
necessarily ties its interpretation to history.20   
There are many varieties of originalist theories.21  Two broad 
types are conceptual and communicative.  Conceptual originalism 
asserts that legal interpretation consists by definition of 
determining the historical meaning of legal texts.  Judges cannot 
use discretion to apply personal or contemporary values when 
interpreting legal text because that simply is not 
“interpretation.”22  Communicative originalism asserts that legal 
text is a communication from an author in the past to the current 
 
rejection of the doctrine of the ‘living Constitution’ ”). Despite some retreat on the goal 
of restraining judges, the core originalist approach still seeks that effect, for example 
by insisting that the original meaning is and must be locked in at enactment. See, e.g., 
Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 
101, 106 (2001). 
14 See, e.g., Green, supra note 8, at 1612. 
15 See, e.g., Keith E. Whittington, Originalism: A Critical Introduction, 82 
FORDHAM L. REV. 375, 386 (2013) (in the 1970s and 1980s). 
16 See, e.g., Solum, supra note 11, at 23. 
17 See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 8, at 621. 
18 See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 586 (1995) (Thomas, J., 
concurring), quoted in Barnett, supra note 13, at 101 n.4 and accompanying text. 
19 See, e.g., Whittington, supra note 15, at 378. 
20 See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 8, at 634 (“Adopting any meaning contrary to the 
original meaning would be to contradict or change the meaning of the text . . . and 
thereby to undermine the value of writtenness.”); id. at 635 (“[A] proper respect for 
the writtenness of the text means that those committed to this Constitution have no 
choice but to respect the original meaning of its text . . . .”); Paulsen, supra note 13, at 
882 (“[T]he specification of the text excludes subjective . . . personal interpretation; it 
excludes anachronistic readings of the meanings of its words . . . .”). 
21 See, e.g., Berman, supra note 5, at 14 (describing seventy-two distinct varieties). 
22 See, e.g., Gary Lawson, On Reading Recipes . . . and Constitutions, 85 GEO. L. 
J. 1823, 1834 (1997) (“As . . . addressed to an external audience, the Constitution’s 
meaning is its original public meaning. Other approaches to interpretation are simply 
wrong.”); Paulsen, supra note 13, at 863. Conceptual originalism does not necessarily 
assert that it imposes any normative constraints on judicial discretion. See, e.g., 
Lawson, supra, at 1823–25; Gary Lawson, Originalism Without Obligation, 93 B.U. L. 
REV. 1309, 1313 (2013) (defining originalism as strictly “a theory of 
meaning . . . evaluated by reference to positive criteria of accuracy in discerning 
communicative signals”). 
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reader.23  Interpretation consists of, and only of, determining the 
meaning—that is, the communicative content—of the written 
text.24  Depending on the particular theory, the Constitution’s 
author might be the Founders,25 the framers,26 the drafters,27 the 
ratifiers, 28 or the general public:  “We the People of the United 
States.”29  Also, depending on the particular theory, the 
communication might consist of the intent of the author, the public 
meaning of the words that the author chose, or both reflexively, as 
“the content the author intended to convey to the reader via the 
audience’s recognition of the author’s communicative intention.”30 
Communicative originalism asserts that this meaning is an 
objective social fact discoverable by empirical investigation31—a 
fact about the world that does not depend on the interpreter’s own 
norms or values.32  This factual meaning has binding normative 
force that flows from the justification of the particular originalist 
 
23 See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Originalist Methodology, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 269, 
272 (2017) (“The authors of a constitutional text are attempting to communicate some 
content to future readers.”). 
24 See, e.g., Whittington, supra note 15, at 389 (“The originalist project is 
committed to uncovering, to the degree possible, the meaning of the rule or principle 
that those who were authorized to create the Constitution meant to communicate, not 
to making use of any particular form of constitutional argument.”). 
25 See, e.g., Post & Siegel, supra note 7, at 548 n.15. 
26 Colby & Smith, supra note 1, at 249–50. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 See Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Originalism as a Legal Enterprise, 23 
CONST. COMMENT. 47, 49 (2006) (citing U.S. CONST. pmbl.). 
30 Solum, supra note 23, at 277 (footnote omitted) (emphasis omitted). Gathering 
these diverse communicative theories into one follows Solum’s approach of 
“[e]cumenical originalism” in lieu of “[s]ectarian originalism” that focuses on the 
differences among rival theories. See Solum, supra note 11, at 9. 
31 See James C Phillips, Daniel M. Ortner, & Thomas R. Lee, Corpus Linguistics 
& Original Public Meaning: A New Tool to Make Originalism More Empirical, 126 
YALE L.J.F. 21, 22 (May 16, 2016). 
32 See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 8, at 621 (“objective approach” to find the “original 
‘objective’ meaning”); Griffin, supra note 5, at 1189 (new originalism emphasizes 
objective version of intent); Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction 
Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95, 99 (2010) (“[T]he linguistic meaning of a text is 
a fact about the world.”). More recent versions of originalism also claim to find law as 
an objective fact. See, e.g., John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original 
Methods Originalism: A New Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against 
Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751, 763 (2009) (“original methods as a necessary 
means to determine objective meaning”); Sachs, supra note 13, at 833 (“[I]t’s still 
possible that social facts ultimately provide the answer, and that this answer supports 
the originalist view.”).  
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theory, such as popular sovereignty,33 the rule of law,34 or consent 
of the governed.35  For example, Randy E. Barnett explains that 
only “adhering [to] the original meaning of the text” can “provide 
security for a consistent, stable and faithful exercise of the 
Constitution’s powers.”36 
II. ANGLO-AMERICAN ORIGINS:  THE CASE OF THE POST-NATI 
The core of originalism appears in Anglo-American 
jurisprudence as early as the seventeenth century in debates over 
the status of Scots in England after the union of the crowns of the 
two kingdoms.  In 1603, the English crown descended to James VI 
of Scotland upon the death of Elizabeth without issue.  James 
styled himself King of Great Britain37 and sought to merge 
England and Scotland into one kingdom.38  The English 
parliament refused.39  He then sought to unify all people born in 
either kingdom after the descent (the post-nati), but the English 
parliament again refused.40  Proponents of James’s position argued 
that subjects owed allegiance to the king in his natural body, so 
that no one born in either kingdom after the descent could be an 
alien in the other.41  Opponents argued that subjects owed 
allegiance to the king in his politic body, so that post-nati Scots 
were natural-born subjects of James VI of Scotland but aliens in 
James I’s England.42  James’s interpretation could not be correct 
because, among other reasons, it would necessarily apply to any 
dominions the king might acquire by descent throughout the 
world, even though their peoples might be more estranged from 
 
33 See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 8, at 613 n.9. 
34 See, e.g., James E. Ryan, Laying Claim to the Constitution: The Promise of New 
Textualism, 97 VA. L. REV. 1523, 1532 (2011). 
35 Colby & Smith, supra note 1, at 275. 
36 Barnett, supra note 8, at 629. 
37 JOHN SPOTSWOOD, THE HISTORY OF THE CHURCH OF SCOTLAND 486 (London, 
R. Norton ed. 1668). 
38 Id. at 480. 
39 Id. 
40 7 THE WORKS OF FRANCIS BACON 639 (London, James Spedding et al.,  
eds. 1859) (preface) (House of Commons refused). 
41 See, e.g., Case of the Union of the Realm of Scotland with England (1608), 2 
How. St. Tr. 559, 570–71 (Lord Coke: allegiance is tied to the king’s body natural, not 
body politic, so the post-nati “are not born out of the kings allegiance, and so not aliens, 
but subjects”); id. at 566 (Earl of Northampton on the harmony of the subjects like the 
parts of the “body natural” under the body’s head). 
42 Id. at 566–68.  
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the English than were Scots.43  Further, it would allow post-nati 
Scots to overrun England, consume its wealth, and disrupt its 
political system;44 and it would unify post-nati of the different 
dominions by shared perpetual natural allegiance even though a 
subsequent descent could easily separate those dominions.45 
James then arranged the filing of companion cases46 in 1608 
in the Court of King’s Bench (Calvin v. Smith)47 and the Court of 
Chancery (Calvin v. Bingley)48 seeking judicial determinations of 
the common law.  The cases were argued together and came to be 
known as the Case of the Post-Nati, or Calvin’s Case.49 
Many of those who propounded James’s position in 
Parliament and in court relied on a radical new way to interpret 
English law.  In an apparent attempt to stifle any further political 
dispute over the status of post-nati Scots, they asserted that 
opposing arguments were merely political, not legal;50 that the law 
precludes judicial discretion and requires specific decisions even if 
they yield bad results in hard cases;51 and that any remedy for 
hard results lies with subsequent legislation.52  As one argued in 
language familiar to originalists: 
The judgments so even and so impartial, as they give way to no 
mans affection, nor impute blame to any man; but to say the law 
requireth such judgment, is an excuse satisfactory to all men, for  
 
 
43 See, e.g., Case of the Post-Nati of Scotland, in 15 THE WORKS OF FRANCIS 
BACON 189, 218 (James Spedding et al., eds. 1864). 
44 See id.; Case of the Union of the Realm of Scotland with England (1608), 2 How. 
St. Tr. at 564 (Sir Edwyn Sandes). 
45 See Case of the Post-Nati, supra note 43, at 222–23. 
46 Id. 
47 Calvin v. Smith (1608), 2 How. St. Tr. 607, 607 (Lord Coke, identifying 
defendants as Richard and Nicholas Smith). The State Trials report, while not a 
standard citation for law reviews, provides the complete set of materials from 
Parliament, the King’s Bench Case, and the Chancery case. An alternative citation to 
the English Reports is: Calvin v. Smith, 77 Eng. Rep. 377 (K.B. 1608). 
48 This case is not generally cited in standard form. The defendants in the case 
were John Bingley and Richard Griffin. See Lord Ellesmere, Lord Chancellor 
Ellesmere’s Speech in the Exchequer Chamber, in the Case of the Postnati (1608),  
2 How. St. Tr. 659, 661 (opinion of Lord Ellesmere in the Chancery case). 
49 See, e.g., 5 THE WORKS OF FRANCIS BACON 106 (Basil Montagu ed. 1826); Polly 
J. Price, Natural Law and Birthright Citizenship in Calvin’s Case (1608), 9 YALE J.L. 
& HUMAN. 73, 81–82 (1997). 
50 Francis Bacon, Speech of Lord Bacon, as Counsel for Calvin, in the Exchequer 
Chamber (1608), 2 How. St. Tr. at 590. 
51 Case of the Union of the Realm of Scotland with England (1608), 2 How. St. Tr. 
at 569 (Popham, C.J.). 
52 Bacon, supra note 50, at 590. 
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the king, and the judges. . . . [I]t were better to live under a 
certain known law, though hard sometimes in a few cases, then 
to be subject to the alterable discretion of any judges.53 
Lord Coke asserted in his report of the decision in Calvin v. Smith 
that “no man ought to take upon him to be wiser than the laws . . . ; 
neither have judges power to judge according to that which they 
think to be fit, but that which out of the laws they know to be right 
and consonant to law.”54  Lord Bacon argued as counsel for Calvin 
that “[f]or us to speak of the mischiefs, I hold it not fit for this 
place, lest we should seem to bend the laws to policy, and not take 
them in their true and natural sense.”55  Only the strict application 
of certain known law prevents “the rule of justice, by which the 
people are governed,” from being too pliable, weak, and 
uncertain.56 
To determine the common law on point, these proponents 
looked to English history under a succession of rulers from the 
Romans through King Edgar, King Ethelredus, the Normans, 
West Saxons, and others.57  They examined in great detail the 
definition of “ligeance” and of its subdivisions,58 the definitions of 
“[a]lienigena” and its subdivisions,59 and “de legibus” and the 
several types of law.60  They relied on the etymologies of words in 
legal usage such as “denizen.”61  They parsed legal texts by clause 
and word.62  They asserted that no foreign law was necessary or 
applicable because the laws of England are copious enough to 
determine cases and because arguments from foreign law would 
be “foreign, strange, and an alien to the state of the question, 
 
53 Case of the Union of the Realm of Scotland with England (1608), 2 How. St. Tr. 
at 569 (Popham, C.J.). 
54 Calvin v. Smith (1608), 2 How. St. Tr. at 612, 656 (Lord Coke). 
55 Bacon, supra note 50, at 606; see also Case of the Union of the Realm of Scotland 
with England (1608), 2 How. St. Tr. at 566 (Earl of Northampton: “Nor . . . can we be 
measured or guided by inconveniences that may be forecast; because we are confined 
to a point of law already received and planted, and are to reason and discuss what 
that law is.”). 
56 Ellesmere, supra note 48, at 677 (summarizing the view, with which he 
disagreed). 
57 Case of the Union of the Realm of Scotland with England (1608), 2 How. St. Tr. 
at 569 (Popham, C.J.); Calvin, 2 How. St. Tr. at 643–45, 646, 650 (Lord Coke). 
58 Calvin, 2 How. St. Tr. at 613 et seq. (Lord Coke). 
59 Id. at 636 et seq. 
60 Id. at 629 et seq. 
61 Id. at 639. 
62 Id. at 618 (breaking down the oath of ligeance into five clauses and examining 
the specific words in each). 
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which . . . is only to be decided by the laws of this realm.”63  They 
concluded that the common law “had continued as a rock without 
alteration in all the varieties of people that had possessed this 
land”64 and prescribed that the post-nati were natural born 
subjects in both kingdoms, not aliens.65  In particular, Coke 
insisted that his judgment for Calvin was not an innovation, but 
merely a “renovation” of earlier decisions.66 
Lord Bacon took an approach similar to many originalists.  He 
argued that laws should be understood in their natural sense,67 
and that critical words in several specifically relevant statutes 
should be interpreted according to their common understanding or 
as mere tropes of speech.68  He argued that the outcome of the case 
required nothing more than common knowledge:  “It is enough 
that every man knows, that it is true of these two kingdoms, which 
a good father said of the churches of Christ: ‘si inseparabiles 
insuperabiles.’ ”69 
The repudiation of judicial discretion and consequentialist 
analysis is notable.  English judges had long exercised both when 
interpreting common and written law70 and would continue to do 
so after Calvin’s Case.71  Rejection of interpretive discretion and 
reliance on scripture only—“sola Scriptura”—was a dominant 
doctrine of English Protestant theology.72  A 1619 sermon, for 
example, dismissed traditional judicial interpretive techniques of 
responsa prudentum, or the opinions of the wise,73 and arbitria 
judicum, or judicial decisions, as inappropriate for interpreting 
scripture because: 
 
63 Id. at 612. 
64 Case of the Union of the Realm of Scotland with England (1608), 2 How. St. Tr. 
at 569 (Popham, C.J.). 
65 Calvin, 2 How. St. Tr. at 656 (Lord Coke). 
66 Id. 
67 Bacon, supra note 50, at 606. 
68 Id. at 585–86. 
69 Id. at 606. 
70 See, e.g., Ellesmere, supra note 48, at 674–76. 
71 See, e.g., Leslies v. Grant (1763), 2 Pat. 68, 77 (interpreting a derivative 
nationality statute narrowly, in part because a broader reading “would let in all  
sorts of persons into the family rights, Jews, French, &c., without any test or 
qualification—without any residence” with the result “in terror” that the law “might 
naturalize one-half of Europe”).  
72 See, e.g., Powell, supra note 1, at 889. 
73 See, e.g., SAMUEL WARREN, SELECT EXTRACTS FROM BLACKSTONE’S 
COMMENTARIES, CAREFULLY ADAPTED TO THE USE OF SCHOOLS AND YOUNG PERSONS 
36 (London, 1837) (“responsa prudentum, or opinions of learned lawyers”). 
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[T]hese rules may be bent, and are bent oftentimes to serve the 
wills and pleasures of men.  But we must have such a rule as may 
be without all exception and variation: a rule that must be, as 
some learned speak in the terms of the Schools, inobliquabilis & 
indeviabilis: a rule that no good man dare, nor no wicked man 
can bend to his private affection.74 
Martin Luther propounded this religious doctrine, which 
relies on the individual’s reading of scripture unmediated by the 
interpretations of ecclesiastical authorities.75 
The claim that deciding cases according to certain, known 
laws is an excuse satisfactory to all—including judges and the 
king—is also notable.  The word “excuse” had several uses at the 
time.  One was “[a] plea for release from a duty, obligation, etc.”76  
In this sense the novel theory operates to release the judge from 
any obligation to exercise discretion or to consider values when 
deciding cases.  The law simply is what it is.  Another use was “[a] 
plea in extenuation of an offence.”77  In this sense, the claim that 
the law simply is the law provides an apology or extenuation of the 
offense of enforcing bad results in hard cases.  If the law provides 
that anyone born in any of the king’s dominions is natural born in 
all of them, and if this creates bad results, that simply is the law; 
there is no blame for James or the judges.  As Lord Bacon argued 
in the case, if the result is bad, then the solution is simple:  
Parliament can enact a statute to change the law.78  Another use, 
less flattering to the novelists, was “a (mere) pretext, a 
subterfuge.”79 
III. THE TRADITIONAL PLURALIST METHOD OF ENGLISH LEGAL 
INTERPRETATION 
Lord Ellesmere reached the same substantive result in his 
decision in Smith v. Bingley, but severely criticized the new 
interpretive approach, calling its proponents “nouelists”80 
[novelists] for having invented it and “busie questionists” for 
having questioned the traditional English method of legal 
 
74 HUMPH. MUNNING, A PIOUS SERMON, PREACHED BY THAT LATE PAINFULL AND 
PROFITABLE MINISTER OF GODS WORD 10 (Cambridge, 1641). 
75 ROLAND H. BAINTON, HERE I STAND: A LIFE OF MARTIN LUTHER 117 (1950). 
76 Excuse, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY def. 2.b (2018), https://www.oed.com/ 
view/Entry/65968?rskey=jyW1GG&result=1&isAdvanced=false#eid. 
77 Id. at def. 2.a. 
78 Bacon, supra note 50, at 590. 
79 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 76, at def. 2. 
80 Ellesmere, supra note 48, at 677. 
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interpretation.81  He criticized arguments from history, definition, 
etymology, religious theory, and pliability.  He then described and 
defended the traditional, pluralist method of English legal 
interpretation. 
Historical interpretation, he explained, “is alwaies darke, 
obscure, and vncerten, of what kingdome, countrey, or place 
soeuer,”82 agreeing with Livy that “many times errors are involved 
in things of such an old age”83 and citing Saint Augustine that the 
supposed books of Enoch “are scorned because of their great 
antiquity.”84 
He noted that other judges used as many definitional and 
etymological interpretations “as wit and art could deuise,”85 
alleging “manie definitions, descriptions, distinctions, differences, 
diuisions, subdiuisions, allusion of wordes, extension of wordes, 
construction of wordes; and nothing left vnsearched to finde” the 
meanings of “ligeantia,” “allegiantia,” “indigenæ,” “alienigenæ,” 
and other like words.86  Ellesmere declined to rely on definitions 
for legal interpretation.  He explained that definition is two-fold: 
first, the identification of genus and difference; and second, the 
description or designation of things.87  As a result, “definition and 
description are often confounded.”88  Yet he did not privilege 
definition proper over definition by description.  He considered 
both to be “vncerten and dangerous,”89 agreeing with Ulpian  
 
81 Id. at 694; cf. id. at 669, 671 (“questionists”). 
82 Id. at 678 (excepting only “the diuine histories written in the bible”). 
83 Id. (as translated from “in tanta rerum vetustate multi temporis errores 
implicantur”). 
84 Id. (as translated from “libri isti ob nimiam antiquitatem reijciuntur”). 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. (as translated from “definitio est duplex: propria, quæ constat ex genere, et 
differentia: impropria, quæ et descriptio vocatur, et est quælibet rei designatio” 
(original citation omitted)). 
88 Id. at 678–79. 
89 Id. at 679; cf. IAN MACLEAN, INTERPRETATION AND MEANING IN THE 
RENAISSANCE: THE CASE OF LAW 109 (1992) (Renaissance view that definition is 
“dangerous: it is suitable for philosophers, but not for jurists,” because “lawyers need 
rules of thumb” and so “[a]ll definitions in law are normative”). This is not a fault of 
the law; indeed, “it is the distinguishing feature of the law to give form to future 
transactions . . . which are . . . indefinite; thus it is not a bad thing, if all cases are not 
covered by the law; indeed this is an impossible aim, given the fragility of human 
intellect.” MACLEAN, supra, at 109 & n.82 (quoting and translating Cagnoli in 
Commentarii ad Titulum Digest. de Regulis Iuris Antiqui 783 (Lugduni, 1593), 
https://books.google.com/books?id=gWxFAAAAcAAJ). 
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that “every definition in civil law is dangerous.”90  Ellesmere 
dismissed “the many and diuerse distinctions, diuisions, and 
subdiuisions . . . made in [the] case” because “anything cut in the 
dust is admixed”91 and because “a man may wander and misse his 
way in mists of distinctions.”92 
Ellesmere ridiculed etymological interpretation, calling it 
“light and deceptive and generally comical”93 and “a pedant 
grammarians fault,”94 noting that “if you examine the examples 
which some doe bring, you will perceiue how ridiculous and vaine 
it is.”95  Worse, he asserted that etymologies are traps for the 
unwary, agreeing with another that they are “word nooses and 
syllable snares.”96  Ellesmere may have referred to the twelfth 
century bishop and philosopher John of Salisbury, who: 
In a witty little passage at the expense of lawyers . . . comments 
on their ability to ensnare the unwary in nooses of words and 
syllables.  He declares that simple-minded folk are lost if they 
learn not this art of ‘syllabizing.’ . . . [He] enriched Mediaeval 
Latin with a new word, a little arrow of sarcasm for the target of 
the Law: ‘to syllabize.’97 
Etymologies tie words to the past at the expense of evolving 
usage, and so Ellesmere rejected them, agreeing with Aquinas that 
“in words, we must look not whence they are derived, but to what 
meaning they are put.”98  Ellesmere’s view on this point apparently 
prevailed, with most of the other judges rejecting reliance on 
etymologies and recognizing that judges merely “use them for 
ornaments” if they happen to be consistent with the judgment in 
the case.99  As Coke acknowledged, “oftentimes where the 
propriety of words is attended to, the true sense is lost.”100 
 
90 Ellesmere, supra note 48, at 678 (as translated from “omnis definitio in iure 
ciuili est periculosa”). 
91 Id. at 679 (as translated from “confusum est quicquid in puluerum sectum est”). 
92 Id. (citing Bishop Juel). 
93 Id. (as translated from “leuis et fallax, et plerumque ridicula”). 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. (as translated from “tendiculæ verborum, et aucupationes syllabarum”). 
97 E.K. Rand, Ioannes Saresberiensis Sillabizat, 1 SPECULUM 447, 447–48 (1926).  
98 Ellesmere, supra note 48, at 679 (translation of phrase “in vocibus videndum, 
non tàm à quo, quam ad quid sumantur” from EDMUND CAMPION, TEN REASONS  
131 (1914)). 
99 Calvin v. Smith (1608), 2 How. St. Tr. 607, 657 (Lord Coke). 
100 Id. (translation of phrase “sæpenumero ubi proprietas verborum attenditur, 
sensus veritatis amittitur” from BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1057 (St. Paul, West 
Publishing Co. 1891)) (citation omitted). 
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Ellesmere also rejected using contemporary Protestant 
theology as a means of legal interpretation, arguing that “what I 
do not read, I do not credit” may govern divinity, but does not 
always govern the interpretation of laws.101  One must distinguish 
morality from divinity to avoid confounding many things in civil 
and politic government.102  And only professional judges with their 
“depth of reason” should determine the law, “not the light and 
shallow distempered reasons of common discoursers walking in 
Powles, or at ordinaries, in their feasting and drinking, drowned 
with drinke, or blowne away with a whiffe of tobacco.”103 
None of these interpretive methods was sufficient to 
determine the law, and therefore Ellesmere sought “a more certen 
rule to iudge by.”104  That was the traditional method, which 
English judges had used for centuries to determine cases governed 
by both common and written law.  He explained that judges should 
rely on practical and analogical interpretation105 and “recur to 
reason, and to the opinions of the wise.”106  By the traditional rule 
of reason and responsa prudentum, justice “hath . . . beene duely 
administred in England, and thereby the kings haue ruled, the 
people haue beene gouerned, and the kingdome hath flourished for 
many hundred yeeres; and then no such busie questionists moued 
any quarrell against it.”107 
The traditional approach did not apply exclusively to 
interpreting the common law.  It also applied to expounding the 
most important texts of ancient English law, Magna Charta and 
Charta de Forests;108 to the three foundational thirteenth-century 
statutes of Westminster, some of whose provisions remain in force 
today;109 and to lesser statutes enacted thereafter, including those 
 
101 Ellesmere, supra note 48, at 674 (translation of phrase “quod non lego,  
non credo” from OFFICIAL CALENDAR OF THE CHURCH 260 (Philadelphia, King & 
Baird, 1849)). 
102 Ellesmere, supra note 48, at 674 (“fidem moralem” from “fidem diuinam”). 
103 Id. at 686. 
104 Id. at 678–79. 
105 Id. at 679. 
106 Id. at 674 (as translated from “recurrere ad rationem, et ad responsa 
prudentum”). 
107 Id.  
108 Id.; 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, LAW TRACTS iii (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1762) 
(declaring no transaction in ancient English history more important than the 
establishment of the Great Charter and the Charter of the Forest). 
109 Ellesmere, supra note 48, at 674; Statute of Westminster I, 3 Edw. 1 c. 5 (1275), 
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/aep/Edw1/3/5/data.pdf (in-force provision guarantees 
free elections); The Statute of Westminster II (De Donis Conditionalibus), 13 Edw. 1 
st. 1 (1285), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/aep/Edw1/13/1 (in-force provision applies to 
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“of fines, of vses, of willes, and many more.”110  None of Magna 
Charta, Charta de Forests, and the Statutes of Westminster was 
written in English; the traditional method applied regardless of 
the text’s language and the passage of centuries from its 
enactment. 
Ellesmere then explained that for the same reason legal 
interpretation does not follow strict rules of grammar: 
By this rule it is also, that words are taken and construed, 
sometimes by extension; sometimes by restriction; sometimes by 
implication; sometimes a disjunctiue for a copulatiue; a 
copulatiue for a disjunctiue; the present tense for the future; the 
future for the present; sometimes by equity out of the reach of the 
wordes; sometime words taken in a contrary sence; sometime 
figuratiuely, as continens pro contento [the container for the 
contents],111 and many other like:  and of all these, examples be 
infinite, as well in the ciuile lawe as common lawe.112 
Ellesmere’s explanation was normative as well as descriptive.  
He defended the traditional approach, including judicial 
discretion, as positive law that is necessary to justice: 
Thus arbitria iudicum [judicial decisions] and responsu 
prudentum [opinions of the wise] haue beene receiued, allowed 
and reuerenced in all times as positive lawe; and so it must be 
still; for, otherwise much mischiefe and great inconuenience will 
ensue.  For new cases happen euery day:  no lawe euer was, or 
euer can be made, that can prouide remedie for all future cases, 
or comprehend all circumstances of humane actions which iudges 
are to determine . . . . They must therefore follow dictamen 
rationis [the dictate of reason]; and so giue speedie justice.  And 
in many matters of materiall circumstances they must guide 
themselues by discretion.113 
He dismissed the argument that the traditional method of 
interpretation makes the law too pliable, weak, and uncertain: 
By the same reason it may be said, that all the lawes of all nations 
are vncerten:  for, in the ciuile lawe, which is taken to be the most 
 
land law); Quia Emptores, 18 Edw. 1 c. 1 (1290), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/aep/ 
Edw1/18/1/contents (Westminster 3: in-force provision applies to land law).  
110 Ellesmere, supra note 48, at 674. 
111 Id. at 675; see, e.g., 4 SELECT SERMONS AND LETTERS, OF DR. HUGH LATIMER 
235 (Philadelphia, Wm. N. Engles, ed., 1842) (“[The] word Church sometimes signifies 
the congregation, the people that are gathered together: and sometimes it signifies 
the place where the people come together; Continens pro contento, that is to say, ‘The 
thing that containeth, for that which is contained.’ ”) (1552 sermon). 
112 Ellesmere, supra note 48, at 675. 
113 Id. at 676. 
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vniuersall and generall lawe in the world, they hould the same 
rule and order in all cases which be out of the direct words of the 
lawe; and such cases be infinite; for as I saide, new cases spring 
euery day, as malice and fraude increaseth.114 
Ellesmere detailed the institutional constraints that make the 
traditional method of legal interpretation successful.  Judges 
should consult with each other and the Privy Council before 
deciding cases.115  And only those who have four important 
qualities should be allowed to become judges:  “[T]here must be 
grauitie, there must be learning, there must be experience, and 
there must be authoritie:  and if any one of these want, they are 
not to be allowed to be interpreters of the lawe.”116 
Finally, Ellesmere rejected Coke’s and Bacon’s 
characterization of the traditional interpretive approach, saying 
that “in this I would not be mis-vnderstoode, as though I spake of 
making of new lawes, or of altering the lawes now standing; I 
meane not so, but I speake only of interpretation of the lawe in 
new questions and doubts,”117 which he recognized were infinite in 
number because “new cases spring euery day, as malice and fraude 
increaseth.”118  Similarly, Nathaniel Bacon later criticized the 
novel approach in Calvin’s Case for taking law to be limited to its 
origins and determined by popular understanding: 
[M]any times Laws are said to be many, when as they are but 
one, branched into many particulars, for the clearing of the 
peoples understanding, (who usually are not excellent in 
distinguishing,) and so become as new Plaisters made of an old 
Salve, for sores that never brake out before.119 
IV. ANTICIPATING CONTEMPORARY DEBATES 
The novelists and Ellesmere anticipated many important 
matters that originalists and their critics debate today, including 
(a) the alleged pliability of pluralism and the claim by Randy E. 
 
114 Id. at 677. 
115 See id. at 672, 675. 
116 Id. at 686. 
117 Id. at 693. 
118 Id. at 677. Ellesmere also asserted that the common law evolves with time and 
that in some cases judges change common law doctrines or disregard them as obsolete. 
See, e.g., id. at 674, 676–78 (Belknappe’s case). 
119 NATHANIEL BACON, THE CONTINUATION OF AN HISTORICALL DISCOURSE, OF 
THE GOVERNMENT OF ENGLAND, UNTIL THE END OF THE REIGN OF QUEEN ELIZABETH. 
WITH A PREFACE, BEING A VINDICATION OF THE ANCIENT WAY OF PARLIAMENTS IN 
ENGLAND 76 (London, 1651). 
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Barnett and others that only adhering to historical meaning can 
provide “consistent, stable and faithful exercise of the 
Constitution’s powers”;120 (b) Justice Brennan’s view that 
constitutional principles reach far enough to apply to new 
mischiefs, not only to those that gave them birth;121 (c) Jack M. 
Balkin’s and Stephen M. Griffin’s emphasis on the constraining 
power of tradition, legal institutions, judicial screening, and 
professional legal culture;122 (d) Stephen M. Griffin’s assertion 
that pluralism is the traditional method of legal interpretation and 
originalism a departure from the status quo;123 (e) Philip Bobbitt’s 
list of six modes of constitutional interpretation—text, history, 
structure, doctrine, prudence, and ethics—and Christopher R. 
Green’s criticism that Bobbitt cannot explain “how to choose 
between them”;124 (f) H. Jefferson Powell’s identification of the 
religious source of originalist interpretive methodologies;125 
(g) Michael Stokes Paulsen’s criticism of those who condescend to 






120 Barnett, supra note 8, at 629; see also Colby & Smith, supra note 1, at 279 
(“[W]ithout the constraint of constitutional text or history . . . ‘the judge has no basis 
other than his own values upon which to’ ” decide cases. (quoting Robert H. Bork, 
Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 10 (1971)); id. 
at 243 (Any other approach inevitably leads to “nihilism and the imposition of the 
judge’s merely personal values on the rest of us.” (quoting Robert H. Bork, Styles in 
Constitutional Theory, 26 S. TEX. L.J. 383, 387 (1985)). 
121 William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary 
Ratification, Text and Teaching Symposium, Georgetown University 7–8 (Oct. 12, 
1985) (“Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes. 
Therefore, a principle to be vital must be capable of wider application than the 
mischief which gave it birth.” (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349,  
373 (1910))). 
122 See Jack M. Balkin, Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution, 103 
NW. U. L. REV. 549, 551 (2009); Griffin, supra note 5, at 1207. 
123 See Griffin, supra note 5, at 1187, 1195–96 (also noting that pluralism dates 
back at least to the adoption of the Constitution). 
124 See, e.g., Green, supra note 8, at 1617 n.21. 
125 See Powell, supra note 1, at 885, 888–90. Powell explains that legal reform 
movements in the American colonies and in interregnum England appealed to this 
religious approach in order to revise laws to be clearer and more accessible to the 
public, and that it was one of several conflicting cultural influences on the founding 
generation’s approach to constitutional interpretation. Id. at 889–91. The arguments 
in Calvin’s Case show that the approach took hold even earlier in English 
jurisprudence. 
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province of elitist judges;126 and (h) a consequence of Stephen E. 
Sachs’s analysis that the only remedy for hard results in 
constitutional cases is to amend the Constitution.127 
Ellesmere’s challenge to novelists and originalists is even 
broader than the specific points he makes in his opinion.  
Ellesmere relied heavily on lessons from civil law practice,128 and 
with good reason.  Civil lawyers had tried and failed to establish a 
theory of law like the one that the English novelists propounded.  
Justinian designed the Corpus Juris Civilis to be a self-sufficient 
statement of his empire’s laws and forbade any commentary on it 
other than nominal exceptions, such as direct translation from 
Latin to Greek.129  He prohibited legal interpretation, 
characterizing it as a perversion of law that creates confusion 
throughout the entire legal system: 
We hereby prohibit [jurists] from producing any other 
interpretations, or rather perversions, of our laws:  lest their 
verbosity should bring dishonour to our laws by its confusion, as 
was done by the commentators on the Perpetual Edict, who by 
extracting new senses from one or another part of this well-made 
edict, reduced it to a multitude of meanings, causing confusion to 
arise in nearly all Roman decrees.130 
The penalty for violating the decree was “deportation and 
confiscation of all property” to prevent verbosity from generating 
further discord.131  Justinian recognized that human law cannot be 
eternal or cover all cases, in part because “nature makes haste to 
bring forth many new forms,” and therefore situations will arise 
outside of “the web of the law.”132  But he insisted that where 
obscurities or problems result, the Emperor alone must deal with 
them because he alone has the authority to make law.133 
 
 
126 Paulsen, supra note 13, at 875 (footnote omitted). 
127 See Sachs, supra note 13, at 844 (“[T]o adhere to our current law . . . means 
recognizing . . . only the future changes that are authorized by our rules of change.”); 
id. at 845 (“We typically recognize something as part of ‘the text’ if it was in the 
original Constitution or was added by an Article V amendment.”). 
128 Ellesmere, supra note 48, at 669, 671, 673, 677, 693. 
129 MACLEAN, supra note 89, at 50–51. 
130 Id. at 52 (Maclean translation). 
131 Id. at 51. 
132 Id. (Maclean translation). 
133 Id. 
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The problem for Justinian was that his theory of law did not134 
and could not135 work.  It was the butt of satire and an 
embarrassment to both jurists and historians.136  It fell before the 
same theoretical and linguistic challenges that communicative 
originalism faces, including (a) whether words contain the essence 
of that which they signify or merely take their meaning from 
conventional linguistic usage,137 (b) whether meaning is a 
discovered fact or is imposed by the adjudicator,138 (c) whether to 
seek legislators’ actual intentions or to construct those of a 
fictitious legislator,139 (d) the collapse of determinate linguistic 
meaning in the face of context,140 (e) the impossibility of 
determining textual clarity as an objective fact,141 (f) the ambiguity 
of “ambiguity,”142 and (g) the inability in practice to distinguish 
and rely on literal, subjective and objective meanings, and on mens 
legislatoris or ratio legis.143  As Ian Maclean concludes in his 
 
134 See, e.g., id. at 52. 
135 See, e.g., id. at 52–53 (ultimate circularity of specific leges). 
136 See id. at 52–53. 
137 See, e.g., id. at 110–11; cf. infra notes 592–599 and accompanying text. 
138 MACLEAN, supra note 89, at 135; cf. Carissa Byrne Hessick, Corpus Linguistics 
and the Criminal Law, 2017 BYU L. REV. 1503, 1525 (2018) (describing the role of 
subjective personal judgment in determining meaning of legal texts even in corpus 
linguistics theories). 
139 MACLEAN, supra note 89, at 147; cf. Caleb Nelson, What Is Textualism?, 91 VA. 
L. REV. 347, 358 (2005) (originalism that is “willing to take account of certain kinds of 
information about the actual purposes and understandings of the specific legislators 
who comprised the enacting Congress”); Lawson & Seidman, supra note 29, at 49 
(originalism using a fictitious legislator, “We the People”). 
140 MACLEAN, supra note 89, at 95–98; cf. infra notes 570–576 and accompanying 
text. 
141 See MACLEAN, supra note 89, at 89–90; cf. Hessick, supra note 138, at 1525 
(detailing the role of context along with subjective personal judgment in determining 
meaning of legal texts); William Baude & Ryan D. Doerfler, The (Not So) Plain 
Meaning Rule, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 539, 541 (2017) (criticizing the plain meaning rule 
for unjustifiably attempting to transcend debate over intentionalism, textualism, and 
other theories of statutory meaning). 
142 MACLEAN, supra note 89, at 130–31 (whether there are two different meanings 
that we cannot distinguish, or a single factual meaning that we lack sufficient 
evidence to determine); cf. Solum, supra note 23, at 287, 294 (irreducible ambiguity 
and the resulting need for constitutional construction); McGinnis & Rappaport, supra 
note 32, at 774 (rejecting constitutional construction; interpreters must select the 
interpretation supported by the stronger evidence and applicable interpretive rules, 
as a result of which “there is no legal ambiguity or vagueness, regardless of whether 
there is vagueness or ambiguity in the ordinary language”). 
143 MACLEAN, supra note 89, at 142–47; see also id. at 200–01 (noting impasse “in 
the dual requirement of a logical analysis of the words . . . according to conventional 
rules of language and a determination of the intention behind their utterance”); id. at 
201 (explaining that Renaissance English commentators were well aware of these 
problems and of the fact that “it is logically impossible to distinguish between an 
2019]	 EVALUATING	ORIGINALISM:	COMMERCE	AND	EMOLUMENTS	 701	
landmark study of legal interpretation in the civil law, “the 
problems which most preoccupy Renaissance jurists can have a 
remarkably modern ring to them.”144 
Despite its failure, Justinian’s approach remained a lodestar 
for like-minded polemicists who blamed legal interpretation for 
political and religious unrest and who championed “a clear, 
unambiguous code of law as a bulwark against it,” asserting that 
“a lucid, generally recognized set of statutes is clearly preferred to 
any amount of jurisprudential interpretation.”145  As Johannes 
Fichard wrote wistfully in 1535, “I only hope that what that 
otherwise excellent emperor did not manage to bring 
about . . . would come to pass at some time in this age . . . .”146  
Many originalists continue to hope that it will come to pass in  
our age. 
Ellesmere’s opinion shows that pluralism is not only a 
legitimate method of legal interpretation; it is the traditional 
Anglo-American method of legal interpretation.  Conceptual 
originalism is inconsistent with Anglo-American legal practice.  
Moreover, originalism, in all of its forms, is a normative aspiration 
that harkens back as far as Justinian’s failed legal theory. 
V. ORIGINALISM AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 
This Part considers two versions of communicative 
originalism in the context of the Commerce Clause, which 
authorizes Congress “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign 
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian 
Tribes.”147  It focuses on the words “to regulate” and “commerce” in 
several noted originalist interpretations.148 
 
utterance which incorporates a given intention and one which uses the same formulas 
of language but does not”); cf. 3 BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, THE COMPLETE WORKS OF 
BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 318 (John Bigelow ed., 1887) (“Such is the imperfection of our 
language, and perhaps of all other languages, that, notwithstanding we are furnished 
with dictionaries innumerable, we cannot precisely know the import of words, unless 
we know of what party the man is that uses them.”). 
144  MACLEAN, supra note 89, at 65. 
145 See id. at 55. 
146 See id. at 55 n.92 (Maclean translation). 
147 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
148 Consequently, the analysis does not consider all of the originalists’ arguments 
defending their interpretations. 
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A. Wooden Communicative Originalism 
After Brest, Powell, and others refuted original intent as a 
theory of constitutional interpretation, originalists turned to 
seeking the original public meaning of constitutional text.  “[W]hat 
the ratifiers . . . enact[ed] must be taken to be what the public of 
that time would have understood the words to mean . . . . When 
lawmakers use words, the law that results is what those words 
ordinarily mean.”149  The meaning of constitutional text is 
normally a matter of period common knowledge, following Lord 
Bacon’s approach.150  Some originalists acknowledge an exception 
for terms of art, noting that the public would recognize terms of 
art and defer to experts in that art.151  The meaning of a legal term 
of art follows from the understanding of learned lawyers, following 
Lord Ellesmere’s approach.152 
Original public meaning originalism began with a very limited 
scope.  Interpreters sought objective meanings of words through a 
“mundane [and] ‘wooden’ ” interpretive method that relied 
principally on dictionary definitions, etymologies and common 
meanings.153  Context played little role. 
Lawrence B. Solum provided a relatively narrow version of 
this theory.  He wrote that constitutional interpretation consists 
of determining or discovering “the semantic content or  
linguistic meaning of the constitutional text” where that semantic 
meaning “is a fact about the world.”154  Meaning in constitutional 
communication is limited to a discrete unit: each clause within the 
Constitution.155  An interpreter must consider each in the context  
 
 
149 ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF 
THE LAW 144 (1990). 
150 See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
151 See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and the Natural Born Citizen 
Clause, 107 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 22, 25 (2007) (observing that an 
ordinary citizen reading phrases like “letters of marque and reprisal” in the 
Constitution would recognize them as technical legal language and defer to the public 
meaning of the phrases as understood by lawyers and by other citizens who had 
consulted lawyers about them). 
152 See supra note 116 and accompanying text. 
153 See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 8, at 621–22 (quoting Gary Lawson, In Praise of 
Woodenness, 11 GEO. MASON U. L. REV. 21, 22 & n.8 (1988)); Barnett, supra note 13, 
at 101, 125. 
154 Lawrence B. Solum, A Reader’s Guide to Semantic Originalism and a Reply to 
Professor Griffin 2–3 (draft of Feb. 18, 2009) (unpublished manuscript) (available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1130665). 
155 Id. at 4, 7. 
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of the rest of the Constitution but cannot view the Constitution as 
a whole as a unit of meaning or it will become “one long primal 
scream.”156 
Context plays no role unless a word or clause’s semantic 
content is ambiguous.157  In that case, one may appeal to a narrow 
context: “the whole text, the basic facts about framing and 
ratification, and so forth.”158  Fundamental to this view is that 
“[t]he linguistic meaning of a constitutional utterance is not the 
conclusion of a normative argument—it is a fact determined by 
conventional semantic meaning and the rules of syntax at the time 
of utterance.”159 
Randy E. Barnett allowed a somewhat greater role for context, 
explaining: 
The most common way of doing this is by resorting to 
dictionaries, and this is a useful starting point.  But when 
interpreting the meaning conveyed by a writing, . . . one must 
take the context in which a word or phrase appears into account, 
combined with how these words are used elsewhere in the 
document and the general purposes for these clauses that can be 
ascertained from the document itself and from circumstances 
surrounding its formation.160 
Nevertheless, Barnett acknowledged that the wooden version 
of communicative originalism can be very disappointing for many 
who “expect to see a richly detailed legislative history only to find 
references to dictionaries, common contemporary meanings, and 
logical inferences from the structure and general purposes of the 
text.”161  But so be it:  “That is the way the objective approach to 
contract interpretation proceeds, and that is how the new 
originalism based on original meaning proceeds as well.”162  Words 
must be taken in accordance with their “generally accepted 
meanings that are ascertainable independently of any one of our 
subjective opinions about that meaning.”163 
 
156 Id. at 8–9. This theory of semantic originalism is not entirely wooden. Beyond 
recognizing a limited role for context, it also accepts that the Constitution may use 
terms of art, may include meanings by implication, and creates new terms and gives 
them meaning—for example, “House of Representatives.” Id. at 4–5. 
157 Id. at 2. 
158 Id. at 14. 
159 Id. at 41. 
160 Barnett, supra note 8, at 633–34. 
161 Id. at 621. 
162 Id. 
163 Id. at 633. 
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Wooden originalism breaks down the term “to regulate 
commerce” into two parts, the verb “to regulate” and the object 
“commerce.”  It relies heavily on dictionary definitions and 
etymologies to define the two.  However, this method quickly 
breaks down in practice.  Consider originalist interpretations of 
the meaning of “commerce.” 
Justice Thomas relies on the etymology of “commerce,” which 
he explains is “with merchandise,”164 and on period dictionary 
definitions by Johnson, Bailey, and Sheridan.165  He concludes that 
at adoption, “commerce” meant “selling, buying, and bartering, as 
well as transporting for these purposes.”166  Raoul Berger, by 
contrast, concludes that “commerce” originally meant “the 
interchange of goods by one State with another.”167 
Problems appear immediately with these two ostensibly 
objective, factual public meanings.  They are incongruous.  Justice 
Thomas’s definition includes “transporting,” but Berger’s does not; 
nor do the dictionary definitions that Thomas relies on.  Does 
commerce involve only merchandise, consistent with Justice 
Thomas’s etymology, or goods more broadly, according to Berger?  
Is there a difference between the two, and are there any other 
objects of commerce?  Does “commerce” mean any interchange, or 
specifically selling, buying, and bartering? 
Other period reference works create more issues.  Jacob’s Law 
Dictionary, the most widely used law dictionary in the early 
Republic,168 explains that “trade” and “commerce” are separate but 
often confounded, with “commerce” properly relating only to trade 
with foreign states.169  Under this definition the Constitution’s 
reference to “Commerce with foreign Nations” is redundant, and 
its reference to “Commerce . . . among the several States” is 
oxymoronic.  Trusler details finer distinctions among types of 
 
164 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 586 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring), 
quoted in Barnett, supra note 13, at 101 n.4 and accompanying text. 
165 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 585–86 (Thomas, J., concurring), quoted in Barnett, 
supra note 13, at 101 & n.3 and accompanying text. 
166 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 585 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring), quoted in Barnett, 
supra note 13, at 101. 
167 See Raoul Berger, Judicial Manipulation of the Commerce Clause, 74 TEX.  
L. REV. 695, 703 (1996), quoted in Barnett, supra note 13, at 103 n.20 and 
accompanying text. 
168 See Gary L. McDowell, The Politics of Meaning: Law Dictionaries and the 
Liberal Tradition of Interpretation, 44 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 257, 260–61, 261  
n.25 (2000). 
169 GILES JACOB, A NEW LAW-DICTIONARY (London, 10th ed. 1782) (unpaginated; 
quotations within the definition of “Inland Trade”). 
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interchange:  “[T]rade[] seems to imply the manufacturing and 
vending of merchandise within . . . ; commerce, negotiating with 
other countries”; and “traffic,” the bartering “with nations[] that 
have not the use of money.”170  He also distinguishes objects of 
interchange by the party that deals with them:  “Merchants deal 
in merchandize, and manufacturers and shopkeepers in wares.  
Merchandize is more the object of commerce; wares of trade.”171  
Neither Thomas’s nor Berger’s proposed definition is consistent 
with the other or with these period reference works. 
It is remarkable that originalists propounded the wooden 
communicative theory in the first place.  Founding-era materials 
undermine any claim that wooden and mundane meanings of 
English words or grammatical rules for their use existed as facts 
in the world that could determine the law.  John Adams wrote in 
1780 that  
to this day, there is no grammar nor dictionary extant, of the 
English language, which has the least public authority, and it is 
only very lately, that a tolerable dictionary has been published 
even by a private person, and there is not yet a passable grammar 
enterprized by any individual.172 
The great lexicographer Samuel Johnson found English to be 
disordered, and the creation of his dictionary to require his own 
choices without any guiding principles or test of purity.173  He 
found English to be 
copious without order, and energetick without rules: wherever I 
turned my view, there was perplexity to be disentangled,  
and confusion to be regulated; choice was to be made out of 
boundless variety, without any established principle of selection; 
adulterations were to be detected, without a settled test of purity; 
and modes of expression to be rejected or received, without the 
suffrages of any writers of classical reputation or acknowledged 
authority.174 
 
170 See 1 JOHN TRUSLER, THE DIFFERENCE, BETWEEN WORDS, ESTEEMED 
SYNONYMOUS, IN THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE; AND, THE PROPER CHOICE OF THEM 
DETERMINED 169–70 (London, 1766). 
171 1 JOHN TRUSLER, THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN WORDS ESTEEMED 
SYNONYMOUS IN THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, POINTED OUT, AND THE PROPER CHOICE 
OF THEM DETERMINED 153 (London, 3d ed. 1794). 
172 CORRESPONDENCE OF THE LATE PRESIDENT ADAMS 161 (Boston, Everett & 
Munroe 1809). 
173 1 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (London,  
W. Strahan 1755) (unpaginated; first preface page). 
174 Id. 
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He found the very concepts of definition and explanation of words 
to be difficult, if not impossible.  “To interpret a language by itself 
is very difficult . . . . When the nature of things is unknown, or the 
notion unsettled and indefinite, and various in various minds, the 
words by which such notions are conveyed, or such things denoted, 
will be ambiguous and perplexed.”175  Johnson had no confidence 
that etymologies had any bearing on the current meanings of 
words, and included them only to help understand words’ 
figurative senses.176  In this, Johnson follows Aquinas, who pointed 
out that “lapis may well be derived from laesio pedis, but that  
does not entail that a piece of iron on which one stubs one’s foot is 
a stone.”177 
It is notable that Adams derided all extant grammars, because 
Samuel Johnson’s dictionary included one.  It consisted of seven 
pages on etymology,178 four on orthography,179 two on prosody,180 
and a mere five sentences on syntax.181  His introduction all but 
dismisses syntax in English, stating that construction of the 
language “neither requires nor admits many rules.  Wallis 
therefore has totally omitted it; and Johnson, whose desire of 
following the writers upon the learned languages made him think 
a syntax indispensably necessary, has published such petty 
observations as were better omitted.”182  Unsurprisingly, one 
strains to find works by originalists that use period grammars to 
interpret the Constitution, even though many argue that 
constitutional interpretation should rely on period grammar, in 
particular on syntax.183 
 
175 Id. (fifth preface page). 
176 See id. (sixth preface page). 
177 MACLEAN, supra note 89, at 110 (footnote omitted). 
178 JOHNSON, supra note 173 (fourth grammar page; describing etymology as “the 
deduction of one word from another, and the various modifications by which the sense 
of the same word is diversified; as horse, horses; I love, I loved”). 
179 Id. (first grammar page; describing orthography as “the art of combining 
letters into syllables, and syllables into words”). 
180 Id. (eleventh grammar page; describing prosody as “the rules of pronunciation” 
and “the laws of versification”). 
181 Id. (eleventh grammar page). 
182 Id. 
183 See, e.g., Solum, supra note 154, at 41. 
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B. Sophisticated Communicative Originalism 
In response to the problems of wooden communicative 
originalism,184 many originalists have expanded their interpretive 
approaches to give context a more meaningful role.  Some delve 
deeply into records of the Philadelphia convention,185 the 
ratification debates,186 general political, philosophical, economic 
and legal history,187 and other sources188 to determine the 
meanings of words and phrases in the Constitution.  Lawrence B. 
Solum shifts his theory to acknowledge that semantics and syntax 
do not fully determine the content of written communication.189  
Instead, the meaning “is almost always partly a function of the 
context in which the communication occurs.”190  One emerging area 
of contextual analysis is corpus linguistics, which uses databases 
of period legal texts, “letters, newspapers, sermons, books, and 
other materials” to analyze how words and phrases were used  
in various contexts during specified periods.191  It shows the 
interpreter far more period uses of words and phrases than 
wooden definitions found in dictionaries and treatises.  Many 
argue that it can make originalism empirical192 and scientific.193 
Randy E. Barnett offers a sophisticated communicative 
analysis of the Commerce Clause,194 seeking “the meaning a 
reasonable speaker of English would have attached to the words, 
phrases, sentences, etc.” in the clause “at the time the particular 
provision was adopted.”195  He grapples with two major issues 
involving “commerce.”  The first is whether commerce includes 
 
184 See, e.g., Phillips, Ortner, & Lee, supra note 31, at 22–23 (detailing evidentiary 
problems, particularly with regard to dictionaries). 
185 See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 13, at 126. 
186 Id. 
187 See, e.g., Robert G. Natelson & David Kopel, Commerce in the Commerce 
Clause: A Response to Jack Balkin, 109 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 55,  
56–58 (2010).  
188 See Josh Blackman & James C. Phillips, Corpus Linguistics and the Second 
Amendment, HARV. L. REV. BLOG (Aug. 7, 2018), https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/ 
corpus-linguistics-and-the-second-amendment/. 
189 Solum, supra note 23, at 273. 
190 Id. at 273. 
191 Blackman & Phillips, supra note 188 (corpus linguistics); see, e.g., Phillips, 
Ortner, & Lee, supra note 31 at 24–27 (corpus linguistics). 
192 See, e.g., Phillips, Ortner, & Lee, supra note 31, at 23–24. 
193 See Clark D. Cunningham & Jesse Egbert, Scientific Methods for Analyzing 
Original Meaning: Corpus Linguistics and the Emoluments Clauses 1–2, 6 (Feb. 12, 
2019) (unpublished manuscript) (available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=3321438). 
194 See generally Barnett, supra note 13. 
195 Id. at 105. 
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transportation.  This is a significant issue for originalists, given 
the large number of eighteenth-century references to commerce 
that include shipping, transportation, and navigation.196  Barnett 
concludes that the original meaning of “commerce” includes 
“navigation” because of its “intimate connection to the activity  
of trading.”197 
The second issue is whether “commerce” differs from “trade,” 
given numerous eighteenth-century uses of the words separately.  
Barnett concludes that “trade and commerce” was merely a 
couplet—like “ ‘full and complete’ stop”—that “refers to a single 
activity that could be, and usually was, called either trade  
or commerce.”198 
Consequently, Barnett concludes that “[c]ommerce” means 
only “the trade or exchange of goods (including the means of 
transporting them).”199  It does not mean “intercourse” broadly, nor 
does it include all “commercial” activities200 like agriculture,201 
manufacturing,202 or insurance.203 
Barnett’s approach differs significantly from wooden 
applications of syntax to meanings of individual words.  First, 
multi-word phrases can have their own meaning separate from the 
meanings of their individual words.204  Second, the meaning of a 
phrase is not dependent on whether it includes a copulative or a 
disjunctive:  “[T]rade and commerce” has the same meaning as 
“trade or commerce,” “trade” alone, or “commerce” alone.  Third, a 
definition can include multiple items that are facially distinct as 
long as they are intimately connected, such as trade and 
transportation.  Fourth, context can separate the meanings of 
words that have the same etymology—“commercial” activities, for  
example, are not necessarily activities in “commerce” despite their 
common root and despite the fact that a principal definition of 
“commercial” is “[e]ngaged in commerce; trading.”205 
 
196 Id. at 122, 125. 
197 Id. at 125. 
198 Id. at 124. 
199 Id. at 146. 
200 Id. at 119–20. 
201 Id. at 136. 
202 Id. 
203 Id. at 120. 
204 Cf. Phillips, Ortner, & Lee, supra note 31, at 23 (arguing that period 
dictionaries defined words, not phrases, whereas corpus linguistics identifies the 
meaning of phrases). 
205 Commercial, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, def. 1.a (2019), http://www.oed. 
com/view/Entry/37081?redirectedFrom=commerical#eid.  
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How strong is Barnett’s argument, and what does it say  
about originalism?  For ordinary words like “commerce,” 
originalists should look to “quotidian” usage in the corpora.206  
Eighteenth-century public uses of “commerce” show a far broader 
understanding than Barnett’s definition, and the extent of popular 
usage shows that ordinary speakers of English did not use it as a 
term of art.  Eighteenth-century usage included the “commerce of 
insurance.”207  For example, there was a longstanding debate 
whether government should prohibit insuring enemy property 
during wartime.  Many opposed any prohibition, arguing that “it 
would be highly impolitic to lay such a restraint on the commerce 
of insurance” because it was highly profitable at the enemy’s 
expense.208  The debate was carried on over many years,209 and the 
popular press reported it, including using the term “commerce of 
insurance.”210  Similarly, a 1686 French edict provided that those 
who “enter into the partnership and commerce of insurance, shall 
not be degraded from their nobility” and prohibited all but 
members of one company “to carry on any commerce of insurance 
and bottomry in the city of Paris.”211 
Many eighteenth-century uses of “commerce” involve matters 
other than goods, such as “commerce of land,”212 “commerce  
in money,”213 and “commerce in slaves.”214  Benjamin Franklin 
characterized payments made to secure enactment of laws as a 
“Kind of Commerce.”215  Nor was the commerce of transportation 
 
206 Cf. Phillips, Ortner, & Lee, supra note 31, at 24. 
207 THOMAS MORTIMER, THE ELEMENTS OF COMMERCE, POLITICS AND FINANCES, 
IN THREE TREATISES ON THOSE IMPORTANT SUBJECTS 176 (London, 1772); cf. GREAT 
BRITAIN, REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND ADJUDGED IN THE COURT OF KING’S BENCH 
xiii (London, 1766) (reporter’s preface: “Trade and commerce are likewise interested 
in this publication [of judicial precedents]. How many cases relative to bills of 
exchange, notes of hand, insurances, charter parties, and stocks, are every day 
determined.”). 
208 MORTIMER, supra note 207, at 176. 
209 See, e.g., JOHN WESKETT, A COMPLETE DIGEST OF THE THEORY, LAWS AND 
PRACTICE OF INSURANCE 197 (Dublin, 1783). 
210 See Art. V. A Complete Digest of the Theory, Laws, and Practice of Insurance, 
64 MONTHLY REV.; OR, LITERARY J. 205, 206 (1781). 
211 WESKETT, supra note 209, at 91 (as translated into English). 
212 HENRY HOME, REMARKABLE DECISIONS OF THE COURT OF SESSION, FROM THE 
YEAR 1730 TO THE YEAR 1752, at 129 (Edinburgh, 1766). 
213 Retribution, 9 ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA 6685 (Edinburgh, 1782); 6 GREAT 
BRITAIN, THE PARLIAMENTARY REGISTER 218 (London, 1782). 
214 11 THE MODERN PART OF AN UNIVERSAL HISTORY FROM THE EARLIEST 
ACCOUNTS TO THE PRESENT TIME 200 (London, 1781). 
215 Benjamin Franklin, Preface to Joseph Galloway’s Speech, NAT’L ARCHIVES 
(Aug. 11, 1764), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Franklin/01-11-02-0083. 
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limited to transporting goods for trade or exchange.  The 
transportation of free persons for profit was also considered trade 
and commerce.216 
Finally, a 1789 treatise on the origin of commerce217 lists a 
myriad of statutes enacted “relative to trade and commerce.”218  
These include statutes encouraging or establishing specific types 
of agriculture,219 manufacturing,220 and fisheries;221 regulating or 
taxing life, property and casualty insurance and annuities;222 
regulating employees, their work opportunities, and wages;223 
regulating the operations of a trading company;224 preventing and 
 
216 Pennsylvania Assembly, Reply to the Governor, NAT’L ARCHIVES (May 15, 
1755), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Franklin/01-06-02-0018 (“[T]he Bill 
itself was calculated to lay Restraints upon the Trade carried on by the Importers of 
[sick] Passengers, &c. and we have, in all our Considerations upon it, endeavoured to 
make it answer those Purposes, without interfering with the other Branches of our 
Commerce, not subject to the same fatal Consequences.”). 
217 4 ADAM ANDERSON, AN HISTORICAL AND CHRONOLOGICAL DEDUCTION OF THE 
ORIGIN OF COMMERCE, FROM THE EARLIEST ACCOUNTS (London, William Combe  
ed. 1789). 
218 See id. at Index (“Laws enacted in this year relative to trade and commerce”). 
219 See id. at 131 (“For further encouraging the growth of silk in America”); id. at 
167 (“For the better cultivating common arable fields”); id. at 261 (“To repeal so much 
of several acts of Parliament, as prohibit the growth and produce of tobacco in Ireland, 
and to permit the importation of tobacco of the growth and produce of that kingdom 
into Great Britain, &c.”); id. at 539 (“For the further encouraging the growth of coffee 
and cocoa nuts, in his Majesty’s islands and plantations in America”). 
220 See id. at 167 (“For establishing a plate-glass manufactory”); id. at 208 (“For 
continuing the encouragement of making indigo in the plantations, &c.”); id. at 261 
(“For better encouraging the Irish linen manufactory”); id. at 539 (“For the more 
effectual encouragement of the manufactures of flax and cotton in Great Britain”); id. 
at 605 (“Respecting the manufacture and importation of cordage for shipping”). 
221 See id. at 188 (“For the encouragement of the fisheries carried on from Great 
Britain, Ireland, and the British dominions in Europe”); id. at 261 (“For the better 
encouraging the white herring fishery”). 
222 See id. at 176 (“For better regulating insurances upon lives, and for prohibiting 
all such insurances, except in cases, where the persons insuring shall have any 
interest in the life or death of the person insured”); id. at 208 (“For registering the 
grants of life annuities, and for the better protection of infants against such grants”); 
id. at 459 (“For charging duty on persons whose property shall be insured against loss 
by fire”); id. at 605 (“For regulating insurances on ships, goods, &c.”). 
223 See id. at 167 (“To regulate the wages or prices of journeymen weavers” and 
“To enable certain persons to work a pestle mill at Tunbridge”); id. at 207 (“For 
settling the hours of labour, and the prices of taking apprentices, in the hat 
manufactory”); id. at 208 (“To allow the callico printers and dyers to employ 
journeymen who have not served a regular apprenticeship to the said trade”). 
224 See id. at 167 (“For establishing certain rules and orders for the future 
management of the affairs of the East India Company”); id. at 207 (“For regulating 
the affairs of the East India Company, as well in Europe as in India, so far as relates 
to altering the time for the choice of Directors”). 
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punishing fraud in trades,225 manufacturing,226 and the payment 
of employee wages;227 granting or extending copyrights and 
patents;228 preventing fires;229 encouraging lending against real 
property;230 and preventing the pawning of certain goods and the 
easy redemption of pawns.231 
Critics quickly pointed out that eighteenth century usage was 
broader than originalists supposed.  Grant Nelson and Robert 
Pushaw, Jr., for example, argued that James Wilson used 
“commerce” to refer to all gainful activity including business 
services like insurance.232  Barnett responds that Wilson was 
actually referring to “the objects of commerce,” suggesting that he 
considered “commerce” to refer only to the “items being traded.”233  
Yet there are many eighteenth-century uses that call non-goods 
“object[s] of commerce” or “subject[s] of commerce” including 
agriculture,234 land,235 money,236 capital stock companies,237 
 
225 See id. at 167 (“For altering the punishment of persons fraudulently marking 
of plate”); id. at 207 (“For preventing frauds in combing wool”). 
226 See id. at 176 (“To amend an act for the more effectually preventing frauds and 
abuses by persons employed in the manufacture of hats, woollen, linen, and cotton 
manufactures”); id. at 262 (“To prevent frauds by private distillers”). 
227 See id. at 262 (“To prevent frauds and abuses in the payment of wages to 
persons employed in the bone and thread-lace manufactory”); id. at 630 (“For the 
further preventing frauds in the payment of seamen’s wages, &c.”). 
228 See id. at 188 (“To enable the different universities in Great Britain, and the 
colleges of Eton, Westminster, and Winchester, to hold, in perpetuity, their copy-right 
in books given or bequeathed to them, for the advancement of learning” and “[t]o 
enlarge the term of letters patent granted to William Clockworth, for the sole use of a 
discovery of certain materials for the making of porcelain”); id. at 207 (“To enlarge Mr. 
Hartley’s patent, for his invention of iron plates to prevent the fatal consequences of 
fires” and “[t]o secure to engravers their property in the engraving branch”). 
229 See id. at 605 (“Respecting party walls, and for the more effectually preventing 
mischiefs by fire, and for extending the provisions of this act, so far as relates to 
manufactories of pitch, &c. throughout England”). 
230 See id. at 167 (“To encourage the subjects of foreign states to lend money upon 
estates in the West Indies”). 
231 See id. at 630 (“To prevent the unlawful pawning of goods, and easy redemption 
of goods pawned, &c.”). 
232 Barnett, supra note 13, at 120. 
233 Id. 
234 1 MALACHY POSTLETHWAYT, BRITAIN’S COMMERCIAL INTEREST EXPLAINED 
AND IMPROVED 101, 130, 138 (London, 1757). 
235 JOHN MILLAR, AN HISTORICAL VIEW OF THE ENGLISH GOVERNMENT 202 
(London, 1790). 
236 1 WILLIAM ROBERTSON, THE HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF THE EMPEROR 
CHARLES V 401 (London, 6th ed. 1787). 
237 THOMAS POWNELL, THE RIGHT, INTEREST, AND DUTY, OF GOVERNMENT 6 
(London, 2d ed. 1781). 
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peerages,238 and the art of engraving.239  Land is the “principal 
subject of commerce,”240 the “most natural subject of commerce”241 
and “the great object of commerce” in part because it “afford[s] the 
highest security that can be given for payment of debt.”242  
Agriculture is “the first object of commerce.”243 
A British writer explained in 1757, for example, that when 
“England prohibited the exportation of corn, she did not consider 
agriculture in the light of commerce, and very frequently suffered 
scarcity,” resulting in high wages for workers; then, “[w]hen 
England, more sensible of her true interests, began to consider 
agriculture as an object of commerce, she found it was impossible, 
by restoring plenty of corn, to lower the high wages the dearness 
of provisions had occasioned.”244  The government then took land 
use measures to deal with the wage issue.245  The writer described 
agriculture—the productive activity—as an object of commerce, 
and he noted the range of causes and effects that the government 
addressed when dealing with that object of commerce, including 
wages and land use. 
“Commerce” clearly had much broader public usage than 
Barnett’s restrictive definition.  How then does Barnett conclude 
that “commerce” had such a narrow public meaning?  First, he 
limits the scope of relevant context.  He purports to identify 
“original meaning” in “the meaning a reasonable speaker of 
English would have attached to the words, phrases, sentences, etc. 
at the time the particular provision was adopted,”246 which he 
claims is objective because “it looks to the public meaning 
conveyed by the words used in the Constitution, rather than to the 
subjective intentions of its framers or ratifiers.”247  Yet he argues 
that “[t]he most persuasive evidence of original meaning” is 
limited to “statements made during the drafting and ratification 
 
238 SIR DAVID DALRYMPLE, THE ADDITIONAL CASE OF ELISABETH, CLAIMING  
THE TITLE AND DIGNITY OF COUNTESS OF SUTHERLAND, BY HER GUARDIANS 80 
(London, 1770). 
239 10 JAMES ANDERSON, THE BEE 299 (Edinburgh, Mundell & Son 1792). 
240 HENRY HOME, ESSAYS UPON SEVERAL SUBJECTS CONCERNING BRITISH 
ANTIQUITIES 157–58 (Edinburgh, 3d ed. 1763). 
241 HOME, supra note 212, at 130. 
242 HENRY HOME, HISTORICAL LAW-TRACTS 145 (Edinburgh, 2d ed. 1761). 
243 JOHN ARBUTHNOT, AN INQUIRY INTO THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE 
PRESENT PRICE OF PROVISIONS, AND THE SIZE OF FARMS 35 (London, 1773). 
244 POSTLETHWAYT, supra note 234, at 138. 
245 See id. at 138–39. 
246 Barnett, supra note 13, at 105. 
247 Id. 
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of the Constitution as well as dictionary definitions and The 
Federalist Papers”248 because “usage outside the context of drafting 
and ratification may mislead us as to what the particular words of 
a particular measure meant at the time of its enactment.  Far from 
providing useful ‘context,’ such historical evidence may instead 
cloud what was otherwise a fairly clear meaning.”249 
This is simply a retreat to seeking the original intent of the 
drafters or ratifiers, which Brest and Powell have already refuted.  
It also evades the question of how to determine the original public 
meaning of words in the Constitution.  Restricting context hides 
ambiguity and unclarity that exist in public usage.  In addition, 
The Federalist Papers were partisan arguments written by only a 
few men.  James Madison later cautioned against relying on them 
too much because, owing to human nature, they were sometimes 
works of zealous advocacy.250 
Barnett concludes that “commerce” includes “navigation” 
because of its intimate connection to trading.  Others might 
equally conclude that “commerce” includes insurance, agriculture, 
manufacturing, and other productive activities because of their 
intimate connection to trade and interchange, or because many 
founding-era ordinary and legal public uses of “commerce” include 
such activities.  This prevents the identification of an original 
public meaning as a non-normative fact about the world. 
Barnett’s ultimate defense of his definition of “commerce” is 
telling: 
I am not disputing here that “commerce” had a broad as well as 
a narrow meaning, or that many . . . strongly favored a national 
government powerful enough to govern all “gainful activities.”  I 
only dispute, on the basis of the evidence of usage presented here 
and the clash of interests that existed in the country at the time, 
that a government of so unlimited a power was adopted in 
1789.251 
Barnett reasons backwards.  He relies on the political 
compromise that he believes was struck to determine the public 
meaning of constitutional text, rather than using the public  
 
 
248 Id. at 146. 
249 Id. at 107. 
250 James Madison, Letter from James Madison to Edward Livingston, NAT’L 
ARCHIVES (Apr. 17, 1824), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/04-03-
02-0291, cited in Powell, supra note 1, at 936 n.262. 
251 Barnett, supra note 13, at 131 (footnote omitted). 
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meaning of the text to determine what compromise was struck.  
His definition is ultimately normative.  The meaning he ascribes 
to “commerce” is his own subjective opinion. 
Barnett takes a similarly normative approach to determining 
the original public meaning of “to regulate.”  He argues that the 
verb “to regulate” means only “to make regular”—that is, to tell 
people how to do something if they choose to do it.252  The verb does 
not include the power to command activity.253  Nor does it include 
the power to prohibit any activity.254  Barnett cites Johnson’s 
dictionary definition of “to regulate” as “1. To adjust by rule or 
method . . . . 2. To direct,”255 which is distinct from Johnson’s 
definition of “to prohibit,” which is “1. To forbid; to interdict by 
authority . . . . 2. To debar; to hinder.”256  Barnett states that 
Johnson does not define either “in terms of the other; each seems 
quite distinct.”257  Barnett concludes that “[t]he power to regulate 
is, in essence, the power to say, ‘if you want to do something, here 
is how you must do it.’ ”258 
Yet the very definition of “to regulate” that Barnett cites 
includes “to direct,” which would authorize the government to 
direct persons to engage in commerce.  Johnson defines “[t]o 
[d]irect” to include “[t]o prescribe certain measure” and “[t]o order; 
to command.”259  His definition of “[t]o prescribe” includes “to 
order” and “[t]o influence arbitrarily.”260 
In addition, the most common founding-era uses of regulating 
commerce in America involved restrictions or prohibitions.261  
Pre-adoption English and British legal uses also contradict 
Barnett.  Statutes for the “regulation” of activities included 
 
252 Id. at 139. 
253 Randy E. Barnett, Commandeering the People: Why the Individual Health 
Insurance Mandate Is Unconstitutional, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 581, 582–83 (2010). 
254 Barnett, supra note 13, at 139. 
255 Id. (quoting SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
(6th ed. 1785)). 
256 Id. (quoting SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
(6th ed. 1785)). 
257 Id. at 140. 
258 Id. at 139. 
259 See JOHNSON, supra note 173; see also Robert G. Natelson, To “Regulate” 
Commerce Means More than To “Make It Regular”, TENTH AMEND. CTR. (Dec. 27, 
2011), https://tenthamendmentcenter.com/2011/12/27/to-regulate-commerce-means-
more-than-to-make-it-regular/ (describing similar definitions in multiple period 
dictionaries). 
260 2 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (London, 
1755). 
261 See Natelson, supra note 259. 
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prohibitions, such as an act for the regulation of insurance that 
prohibited certain types of insurance and virtually all types of 
reinsurance;262 “[a]n Act to regulate [b]uying and [s]elling of [h]ay 
and [s]traw” that prohibited many such transactions;263 and an act 
regulating a trade that prohibited most persons from practicing 
the trade.264  As a jurist and central figure in the Scottish 
Enlightenment265 noted in 1777, “[i]t is the privilege of every state 
to regulate matters within its own territory.  The legislature may, 
in particular, prohibit certain goods to be imported, whether by 
natives or by foreigners.”266 
It is clear that public usage of “to regulate” included “to 
prohibit.”  So Barnett turns to circumstantial and purposive 
arguments to argue that “to regulate” does not include the power 
to prohibit commerce “among the several States” even though it 
does include the power to prohibit commerce “with foreign 
Nations” and “with the Indian Tribes.”  He appeals to 
“circumstantial textual evidence”267 and to purported “known 
purposes of the founders,”268 which differed for regulating 
commerce among the three jurisdictions, “as is well known.”269 
Barnett does not objectively justify his reliance on purposes of 
the founders rather than of the ratifiers or of the American public.  
Nor does he objectively justify his preference for some “well 
known” purposes over others.  He acknowledges that evidence of 
purposes could be a reversion to original intent originalism, but 
argues that “evidence of publicly known purposes helps to shape 
the original public meaning of words and phrases.”270  Given the 
many conflicting purposes involved in the creation and adoption of 
 
262 See An Act to Regulate Insurance on Ships Belonging to the Subjects of Great 
Britain, and on Merchandizes or Effects Laden Thereon, 19 Geo. 2 c. 37, §§ 1, 4 (1746).  
263 See An Act to Regulate the Buying and Selling of Hay and Straw, etc., 36 Geo. 
3 c. 38, § 8 (1796). 
264 See An Act for Regulating the Trade of Silk-Throwing, 13 & 14 Car. 2 c. 15,  
§ 2 (1662). 
265 See Gordon Graham, Henry Home, Lord Kames (1696–1782), INST. FOR THE 
STUDY OF SCOTTISH PHILOSOPHY, http://www.scottishphilosophy.org/philosophers/ 
henry-home/ (last visited Oct. 18, 2019). 
266 HENRY HOME, ELUCIDATIONS RESPECTING THE COMMON AND STATUTE LAW OF 
SCOTLAND 149 (Edinburgh, 1777). 
267 See Barnett, supra note 13, at 144. 
268 See id. at 144 n.207. 
269 See id. at 145 (outlining different purposes for granting Congress the power to 
regulate trade with foreign nations than among the states, “as is well known”); id. at 
146 (detailing purported different purposes of the power to regulate commerce with 
foreign nations than among the states). 
270 See id. at 146 n.213. 
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the Constitution, including the purpose of strengthening the 
federal government relative to the Articles of Confederation,  
only a reversion to original intent or the interpreter’s own 
normative judgment can justify one purposive interpretation of 
the commerce power over another.  Barnett’s interpretive 
approach is surprisingly similar to a target of Michael Stokes 
Paulsen’s criticism: identifying an abstract principle in the 
Constitution, assigning it a specific content based on the 
interpreter’s own discernment, then infusing that content into 
particular constitutional provisions.271 
Barnett’s interpretation assigns two contrary, original public 
meanings to the same verb with respect to different direct objects 
in the same constitutional clause.  He severs the meaning of the 
words from the plain syntax of the clause; his discernment of 
purposes, not the linguistic meaning of the word, controls.272  He 
follows Ellesmere, who notes that words are often construed “in a 
contrary sense.”273 
Barnett apparently recognizes this issue for his proposed 
original public meaning of “to regulate.”  He responds that words 
can be ambiguous, noting contracts cases in which two different 
counterparties mean different things by the same word, such as 
each referring to a different ship with the same name “Peerless.”274  
However, the Commerce Clause has only one putative collective 
author.  Barnett’s analogy cannot apply to the objective meaning 
of a single verb that a single author applies to three direct objects 
in the same clause.  He ultimately retreats to original intended 
purpose to interpret the clause:  “[W]hen a group of people agrees 
to use one word to connote, depending on the circumstances, two 
different meanings, they have objectively manifested their 
intentions, albeit in an awkward manner that makes the objective 
meaning of their words sometimes difficult to discern.”275  
Barnett’s interpretation cannot follow from an ordinary English 
speaker’s understanding of the meaning of “to regulate.”  It can  
 
 
271 See Paulsen, supra note 13, at 878–79. 
272 Cf. Natelson, supra note 259 (“[I]n the Commerce Clause the verb ‘regulate’ 
has three objects, not just one: interstate, foreign, and Indian commerce. Under 
Founding-Era (as well as modern) rules of interpretation you should read ‘regulate’ 
the same way for all three.”). 
273 See supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
274 See Barnett, supra note 13, at 144 n.207 (citing Raffles v. Wichelhaus, 2 Hurl. 
& C. 906, 159 Eng.Rep. 375 (Ex. 1864)). 
275 Id. at 145 n.207. 
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only reflect a retreat to original intent or a construction by a 
scholar applying legal interpretive techniques to a verb that is not 
a term of art. 
Barnett’s ultimate defense of his interpretation of “to 
regulate” in the context of directing individuals to engage  
in commerce is also normative.  He acknowledges that the 
Constitution allows the federal government to commandeer 
individuals.276  But he argues that the power is limited:  “The very 
few mandates that are imposed on the people pertain to their 
fundamental duties as citizens of the United States, such as the 
duty to defend the country or to pay for its operation.”277  The claim 
that some duties are fundamental and allow commandeering but 
others are not is purely normative.  Barnett exercises his own 
normative judgment about the duties of citizens to determine the 
meaning of a constitutional term rather than using the meaning 
of the term to determine the individual’s duties.  The Preamble 
specifies both “promot[ing] the general Welfare” and “provid[ing] 
for the common defence” as purposes for which “We the 
People . . . do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United 
States of America.”278  Directing individuals to engage in 
commerce, such as purchasing health insurance, to promote the 
general welfare is no different in this context from directing them 
to pay taxes to promote the general welfare or to serve in the 
armed forces to provide for the common defense. 
Originalist interpretations of the Emoluments Clauses 
demonstrate the same reliance on their authors’ own normative 
judgments, as Part VI shows. 
VI. ORIGINALISM AND THE EMOLUMENTS CLAUSES 
This Part evaluates communicative originalism in the context 
of litigation over the application of the Constitution’s Emoluments 
Clauses to President Trump’s business activities with federal 
agencies and state and foreign governments.  The Constitution 
contains three Emoluments Clauses: 
No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which 
he was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the 
Authority of the United States, which shall have been created, or 
the Emoluments whereof shall have been encreased during such 
 
276 Barnett, supra note 253, at 582–83. 
277 Id. 
278 U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
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time; and no Person holding any Office under the United States, 
shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in 
Office.279  [the first of these clauses, the “Congressional 
Emoluments Clause”] 
 
No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States: And 
no Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under them, shall, 
without the Consent of the Congress, accept of any present, 
Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, 
Prince, or foreign State.280  [the “Foreign Emoluments Clause”] 
 
The President shall, at stated Times, receive for his Services, a 
Compensation, which shall neither be encreased nor diminished 
during the Period for which he shall have been elected, and he 
shall not receive within that Period any other Emolument from 
the United States, or any of them.281  [the “Domestic Emoluments 
Clause”] 
A. Wooden Communicative Originalism 
Many of the arguments in litigation over the Emoluments 
Clauses follow the wooden early version of communicative 
originalism.  President Trump cites period dictionaries to assert 
that “emolument” means a “profit arising from an office or employ” 
and therefore cannot apply to business transactions.282  In 
particular, he notes that the Oxford English Dictionary lists his 
proposed definition first and that it “lists each definition in the 
order it appeared in the English language to ‘illustrate the word’s 
development over time.’ ”283  He also argues that the definition 
properly follows from the etymology of “emolument,” which derives 




279 Id. art. I, § 6, cl. 2. 
280 Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 8. 
281 Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 7. 
282 Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 28, 
Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Wash. v. Trump, 276 F. Supp. 3d 174 
(S.D.N.Y. 2017) (No. 17 Civ. 458 (RA)). 
283 Defendant’s Reply in Support of His Motion to Dismiss at 21, Citizens for 
Responsibility and Ethics in Wash. v. Trump, 276 F. Supp. 3d 174 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) 
(No. 17 Civ. 458 (GBD)). 
284 Id. 
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Critics cite definitions from a broader group of English 
language dictionaries from 1604 to 1806 to argue that 
“emoluments” means any profit, gain or advantage.285  They 
conclude that the Emoluments Clauses forbid the President to 
receive any profit, gain, or advantage from federal, state or foreign 
governments, including any direct or indirect profits from those 
governments patronizing the Trump International Hotel in 
Washington, D.C.286  Critics provide a statistical analysis of each 
usage in the dictionaries, ranging from 92.5% using “profit” and 
82.5% using “advantage” to only 7.5% using “employ” or “office.”287  
They show further that every dictionary definition used one or 
more of “profit,” “advantage,” “gain,” or “benefit,” and that over 
92% of them exclusively defined “emolument” in those terms.288  
Therefore, they conclude that the public meaning of “emolument” 
at adoption was broad: any “profit” or “gain.”289  “[W]hen a 
narrower meaning was intended, it was accompanied by 
[restrictive] language” such as “of the offices” or “annexed to their 
offices.”290 
Critics also attack the dictionaries that the President relies 
on.  First, they argue that there is little, if any, evidence that those 
dictionaries “were owned, possessed, or used by the founders, let 
alone had any impact on them or on those who debated and ratified 
the Constitution.”291  “By contrast, all of the dictionaries that the 
founding generation did possess and use regularly define 
‘emolument’ in the broad manner favoring the plaintiffs: ‘profit,’ 
‘advantage,’ or ‘benefit.’ ”292  Second, “Trusler’s volume is not a 
standard dictionary, but rather a thesaurus, which presumes that 
 
285 Brief of Amicus Curiae by Certain Legal Historians on Behalf of Plaintiffs at 
25, Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Wash. v. Trump, 276 F. Supp. 3d 174 
(S.D.N.Y. 2017) (No. 17 Civ. 458 (GBD)) [hereinafter “Legal Historians”]. 
286 Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 6, 
32, 52, Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Wash. v. Trump, 276 F. Supp. 3d 174 
(S.D.N.Y. 2017) (No. 17 Civ. 458 (GBD)). 
287 John Mikhail, The Definition of “Emolument” in English Language and Legal 
Dictionaries, 1523–1806, A-5 (Aug. 4, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2995693). 
288 Id. at 8. 
289 See Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, 
supra note 286, at 35. 
290 Id. at 36 (quoting John Mikhail, A Note on the Original Meaning of 
“Emolument”, BALKANIZATION (Jan. 18, 2017), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2017/01/a-
note-on-original-meaning-of-emolument.html (listing examples from the Federalist 
Papers)). 
291 Legal Historians, supra note 285, at 2.  
292 Id. at 3. 
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‘gain,’ ‘profit,’ and ‘emolument’ are synonyms; moreover, its 
explanation of ‘emolument’ was copied directly from a French 
thesaurus, hence it is not even reliably grounded in English 
usage.”293  Third, “emolument” cannot be a term of art with the 
President’s asserted narrow meaning because it was not a defined 
term in the most significant common law dictionaries from 1523 to 
1792; they merely use the word in other definitions.294 
The President retorts that period lexicographers may have 
copied each other’s definitions.295  Moreover, they did not and could 
not systematically discern all meanings of words.296  Finally, their 
dictionaries “were generally more prescriptive about how 
language should be used, rather than descriptive of how it was 
actually used at the time.”297 
Ellesmere’s attack on the novel interpretive method 
demonstrates the futility of the wooden originalist approach.  
Period dictionaries include a wide range of inconsistent 
definitions, none of which can provide a non-normative original 
public meaning of the term “emoluments” in the Constitution.  
Indeed, by asserting that lexicographers did not and could  
not discern all meanings of words, the President undercuts the 
case for adopting his dictionary-based narrow meaning of 
“emoluments.” 
Etymologies are even less useful.  The President relies on one 
reference work that provides a narrow definition tied to labor in 
an office or employ.298  However, another etymological dictionary 
defines “emolument” as “profit gotten properly by grist, or 
whatever is ground at the mill: hence used to signify any 
advantage, or gain.”299  Indeed, the phrase “to bring grist to the 
(one’s) mill” has been used since 1583 to mean “to bring business 
to one’s hands; to be a source of profit or advantage.”300  One 
important use in the founding-era context of debates over public 
trust was the exact opposite of the President’s interpretation: 
emoluments for doing no work at all, including gratuitous 
 
293 Id. 
294 Id. at 4.  
295 Def.’s Reply Mot. Dismiss, supra note 283, at 20. 
296 Id. 
297 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
298 Id. at 21. 
299 Emoluments, ENGLISH ETYMOLOGY; OR A DERIVATIVE DICTIONARY OF THE 
ENGLISH LANGUAGE IN TWO ALPHABETS (London, George William Lemon ed., 1783). 
300 Grist, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, def. 2.c (2019), https://www.oed.com/ 
view/Entry/81626?rskey=TYrzeD&result=2#eid.  
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emoluments301 and emoluments for no-show jobs.302  Etymologies 
are vain and comical ornaments for judicial opinions and traps for 
the unwary.  They cannot provide constitutional meanings. 
The litigation over the Emoluments Clauses demonstrates 
that wooden communicative originalism has not overcome the 
challenges that original intent originalism faced.  One cannot 
determine a factual meaning by counting dictionary votes any 
more than “intention-votes.”303  Dictionaries, thesauruses, and 
other reference works cannot capture all meanings of words.  The 
choice of a particular word does not necessarily communicate its 
original etymological meaning, and the order in which a usage 
appeared cannot determine the word’s communicative content at 
a time when other uses have arisen. 
There is no way to determine as a matter of fact whether to 
charge adopters with the meaning of the words that they choose, 
regardless of whether they have read all extant dictionaries, or 
instead to charge their audience with knowing the definitions in 
the dictionaries that the adopters actually read.  And in the latter 
case, it is not possible to determine as a matter of fact how to 
determine a single meaning if different adopters have read 
different dictionaries.  Dictionary definitions are facts.  The text of 
the Constitution is a fact.  But the communicative content of 
constitutional text is not a fact. 
B. Sophisticated Communicative Originalism 
Seth Barrett Tillman, Robert G. Natelson, and two teams of 
linguistics scholars have offered sophisticated originalist 
interpretations of the Emoluments Clauses.  This Part considers 
their interpretations and provides counterarguments.  It suggests 
that their approaches cannot determine a non-normative public 
meaning of the Clauses and further that they are better 
understood as part of the latest evolution of originalism: original 
law304 or original methods305 originalism.  Stephen Sachs explains 
that this newer version of originalism 
isn’t just about recovering the meaning of ancient texts, a project 
for philologists and historians.  Instead, it’s about determining 
the content of our law, today, in part by recovering Founding-era 
 
301 See THE GENUINE LETTERS OF JUNIUS xv (London, 1771). 
302 27 GREAT BRITAIN, THE PARLIAMENTARY REGISTER 618 (London, 1790).  
303 Brest, supra note 1, at 212–13. 
304 See Sachs, supra note 13, at 858, 875–76. 
305 See, e.g., McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 32, at 751. 
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doctrine.  That means learning some history, but it also means 
exercising legal judgment, the kind we hire lawyers 
for. . . . [O]riginalism is just ordinary lawyer’s work.306 
1. Seth Barrett Tillman’s Approach 
Tillman writes that “our task is to understand what the 
American public thought the meaning of” relevant text “was 
between 1787 and 1790, the time period during which the original 
thirteen states ratified the Constitution.”307  We should find 
roughly contemporaneous evidence to determine the “probable or 
likely public understanding of disputed constitutional text.”308  
Tillman surveys the evidence and proposes narrow constitutional 
meanings for “emoluments” generally and for offices “under” the 
United States within the Foreign Emoluments Clause specifically. 
a. Office Under 
Tillman asserts that the Foreign Emoluments Clause does not 
apply to an elected office like the presidency because it is not an 
“Office of Profit or Trust under” the United States.309  He argues 
that the term is a legal term of art taken from the British “Office 
under the Crown,” which did not reach elected positions.310  If he 
is correct, then the president is exempt from the Foreign 
Emoluments Clause but remains subject to the Domestic 
Emoluments Clause. 
 
306 Sachs, supra note 13, at 821–22 (emphasis omitted); see also id. at 821 (“To 
find out the law that the Constitution made, the relevant way to read the document’s 
text would be according to the rules of the time, legal and otherwise, for turning 
enacted text into law. If that version needs a label, we could call it ‘original-law 
originalism’: the view that the Constitution should be read according to its original 
legal content, whatever that might have been.”); cf. McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 
32, at 752 (“[W]e argue that the premises underlying the two leading approaches to 
originalism—original intent and original public meaning—lead, if properly 
understood, to the view that the Constitution should be interpreted based on the 
enactors’ original methods.”). But see, e.g., Whittington, supra note 15, at 389 (“The 
originalist project is committed to uncovering, to the degree possible, the meaning of 
the rule or principle that those who were authorized to create the Constitution meant 
to communicate, not to making use of any particular form of constitutional 
argument.”). 
307 Seth Barrett Tillman, The Original Public Meaning of the Foreign Emoluments 
Clause: A Reply to Professor Zephyr Teachout, 107 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 180,  
205 (2013). 
308 Id. at 186 (footnote omitted). 
309 Brief for Scholar Seth Barrett Tillman as Amicus Curiae in Support of the 
Defendant at 13, Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. Trump, 276 F. Supp. 
3d 174 (S.D.N.Y 2017) (No. 17 Civ. 458(RA)) (quoting U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9, cl. 8).  
310 Id. at 20. 
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Zephyr Teachout identifies many public uses indicating that 
the public understood “office under” to reach elected positions.311  
Tillman responds that they are not probative because they either 
predate the use of the term of art in the drafting of the 
Constitution or post-date it so greatly that they reflect the loss of 
understanding of the original meaning of such a precise term.312 
There is some public usage supporting Tillman’s view that the 
term did not reach the president.  In 1790, the former 
Superintendent of the Finances of the United States described 
that position as “the most important office under the 
government,”313 which implies that he did not consider the 
presidency to be an office under the United States.  After Thomas 
Jefferson’s election, an anonymous author called the Secretary of 
State “the highest office under the government,”314 stated that 
newly-appointed Secretary of State James Madison “found all the 
offices under the general government exclusively in the possession 
of federalists and tories,”315 and argued that President Jefferson’s 
election “audibly declared, that a change was absolutely 
necessary, not merely in the high elective offices of the 
government, but also of those in its disposal.”316 
However, other period uses included elected offices.  The 
Continental Congress entertained a motion in 1785 to disqualify 
any member of Congress “from being elected by the United States 
in Congress assembled, to any office of trust or profit, under the 
said states.”317  And George Mason considered the president to be 
subject to the Foreign Emoluments Clause.318 
 
311 See Zephyr Teachout, Gifts, Offices, and Corruption, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 
COLLOQUY 30, 42–44, 46 & n.67 (2012). 
312 See, e.g., Tillman, supra note 307, at 190–91; Seth Barrett Tillman, Either/Or: 
Professors Zephyr Rain Teachout and Akhil Reed Amar – Contradictions and 
Suggested Reconciliation 108 (Jan. 12, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (available at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1970909). 
313 2 UNITED STATES, THE JOURNAL OF THE SENATE 23 (Martin P. Claussen ed., 
Michael Glazier, Inc. 1977) (1790). 
314 THE REPUBLICAN CRISIS 9 (Alexandria, 1812). 
315 Id. at 10. 
316 Id. 
317 28 UNITED STATES, JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774–1789, at 
388 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., U.S. Gov’t. Printing Office 1933) (1785). 
318 See 3 JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS 
ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AS RECOMMENDED BY THE 
GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 484 (Philadelphia, J.B. 
Lippincott Co. 1891).  
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Tillman acknowledges that state law usage of “office under” 
“seems akin to the Constitution’s,”319 and that usage included 
election to offices under a state.  St. George Tucker referred to both 
election to “any office” and election to “any office under the  
state” in his famous 1803 American edition of Blackstone’s 
Commentaries.320  In addition, the 1819 Maine Constitution 
referred to “every person elected . . . to any . . . office under this 
State.”321 
Popular usage also included elected offices.  Accounts of the 
Connecticut charter published by order of Congress referred to 
both persons “elected to any office in the government” and persons 
“elected to any office under Government.”322  The Pennsylvania 
governorship was an elected position,323 and a 1789 news article 
described a proposal to forbid the governor to “hold any other office 
under this State.”324  A 1790 article referred to the governor as 
holding an office under the state constitution,325 and in the same 
year James Wilson, a founder and sitting United States Supreme 
Court Justice, described the governor as holding an office under 
Pennsylvania.326  A 1793 New York article refers even more 
 
319 Tillman, supra note 312, at 63. He acknowledges that state law authorities are 
not uniform, so they provide only some authority for his interpretation. Id. at 64. 
320 See 1 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF 
REFERENCE, TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE 
UNITED STATES; AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, pt. 1, app. at 184 
(Philadelphia, William Young Birch & Abraham Small, 1803) (describing a Virginia 
statute as requiring five years of residence “before any naturalized foreigner is capable 
of being elected to any office under the state”); id. at pt. 2, 375 (describing the Virginia 
statute as requiring five years residence “before any naturalized foreigner can be 
elected or appointed to any office, legislative, executive, or judiciary”). The actual 
statute utilizes the latter language. See Act of Oct. 11, 1786, reprinted in 12 THE 
STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA, FROM THE 
FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE, IN THE YEAR 1619, at 262 (William Waller 
Hening ed., Richmond, Va., J & G. Cochran 1823) (“[T]hey shall not be capable of 
election or appointment to any office, legislative, executive, or judiciary, until an 
actual residence in the state of five years . . . .”). 
321 ME. CONST. art. 9, § 1 (1819). 
322  THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE SEVERAL INDEPENDENT STATES OF AMERICA 51 
(London, J. Stockdale 1782) (“elected to any office in the government”); THE 
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE SEVERAL INDEPENDENT STATES OF AMERICA 135 (London, J. 
Stockdale 1783) (“elected to any office under Government”). 
323 PA. CONST. of 1790, art. II, § 2, reprinted in 12 SAMUEL HAZARD, 
PENNSYLVANIA ARCHIVES 15 (Philadelphia, Joseph Severns & Co. 1856). 
324 See GAZETTE OF THE UNITED STATES (New York), Dec. 26, 1789, at 294 
(proposal in an earlier draft of the 1790 state constitution). 
325 See GAZETTE OF THE UNITED STATES (New York), Sept. 22, 1790, at 603. 
326 3 JAMES WILSON, THE WORKS OF THE HONOURABLE JAMES WILSON, L.L.D. 
341–42 (Philadelphia, 1804) (speech in a 1790 Pennsylvania convention opposing the 
incompatibility proposal). 
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generally to persons “elected to any office under the government of 
the state or of the United States.”327  In addition, a 1797 New York 
newspaper article described an elected senator as holding “an 
important office under the government of this state.”328 
Other uses imply that elected executive offices are  
offices under state and federal governments.  Maryland’s 1776 
Constitution provided that no person 
holding any office under the united states, or any of them, or a 
minister or preacher of the gospel of any denomination, or any 
person employed in the regular land service, or marine, of this or 
the united states, shall have a seat in the general assembly, or 
the council of this state.329 
Given the breadth of the disqualifications, it would be fanciful to 
interpret “office under the united states, or any of them” to allow 
holders of elected executive offices of other domestic governments 
to sit in the Maryland general assembly or council.330  Moreover, 
usage in the First Congress suggests that elected executive offices 
are offices for purposes of every constitutional provision.  
Representative Sedgwick described the vice president as “an 
officer by the constitution,”331 and James Madison advised that 
“[w]e are to consider his appointment as part of the 
constitution.”332 
Madison’s use of “appointment” for the elected position of vice 
president counsels against drawing fine distinctions between 
elected and appointed offices in public meaning constitutional 
interpretation333 where the relevant provision does not include 
 
327 THE DIARY; OR, LOUDON’S REGISTER (New York), Mar. 28, 1793, at 2. 
328 OTSEGO HERALD (Cooperstown, N.Y.), Jan. 12, 1797, at 2. 
329 MD. CONST. § 37 (1776), reprinted in THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE SEVERAL 
INDEPENDENT STATES OF AMERICA 111 (London, J. Stockdale 1782). 
330 Tillman notes that Charles Carroll sat in both the Maryland and federal 
Senates from 1789 to 1792. Tillman, supra note 307, at 199. This precedent suggests 
that “office under” did not include elected legislative positions. But it is inapposite to 
elected executive offices. 
331 6 MATHEW CAREY, THE AMERICAN MUSEUM 19 (Philadelphia, 1789) 
[hereinafter MUSEUM]. 
332 1 THOMAS HART BENTON, ABRIDGMENT OF THE DEBATES OF CONGRESS, FROM 
1789 TO 1856, at 121 (New York, D. Appleton & Co. 1860) (debate of July 16, 1789). 
333 Cf. JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 317, at 388 (motion 
to disqualify any member of Congress “from being elected by the United States in 
Congress assembled, to any office of trust or profit, under the said states”); Gen. Ct. 
Mass. Res. 109, in ACTS AND LAWS OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS 379 
(Boston, Adams & Nourse 1783) (original proposal was to prohibit members from 
being “appointed to any office, under the States”). 
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either word.334  In 1789, the New York legislature referred to 
George Washington’s “election to” and “appointment to” the 
presidency in the same sentence.335  The governor and council of 
North Carolina wrote to President Washington that his 
“appointment to the first office in the union” would no doubt 
accelerate the state’s ratification of the Constitution.336  And an 
1801 New York article defended officeholders of the Clinton family 
against charges of oligarchy by pointing out that they held elected 
offices under the state constitution.337 
Finally, Tillman provides no evidence that anyone in “the 
American public”338 believed that “office under” was a term of art 
for whose meaning they should defer to lawyers.  He does not cite 
a single public use in which anyone—Founder, drafter, ratifier, or 
other—links the constitutional term and the British legal term.  
This contrasts with the Constitution’s term “natural born,” for 
example, which has numerous founding-era uses linked to British 
uses of the term.339 
How does Tillman conclude that “office under” incorporates 
the British term of art despite significant contrary public usage 
and the absence of public usage linking them?  This Article 
suggests that he exercises legal judgment to determine 
founding-era doctrine—his originalism, like Sachs’s, “is just 
ordinary lawyer’s work.”340 
 
 
334 Cf. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2 (“appointed to any civil Office”). 
335 MUSEUM, supra note 331, at 103. 
336 Id. at 23. 
337 See AM. CITIZEN AND GEN. ADVERTISER (New York), Aug. 21, 1801, at 2 
(“[T]here is not a single one in the whole who holds an office under the state 
constitution by appointment. George Clinton, esq., is elected governor, and DeWitt 
Clinton, esq. is a senator, also by election.”). 
338 See Tillman, supra note 307, at 205 (arguing that the goal is to determine 
“what the American public thought the meaning of” relevant text was at the time of 
the Constitution’s adoption). 
339 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5 (presidential qualifications); John 
Adams, Draft Articles to Supplement the Preliminary Anglo-American Peace Treaty, 
NAT’L ARCHIVES (ca. Apr. 27, 1783) (art. 1), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/ 
Adams/06-14-02-0278 (1783 proposal to grant British subjects all of the rights “of 
natural born Citizens” of the United States in exchange for Britain granting U.S. 
citizens all of the rights of “natural born Subjects” of the crown); Virginia House  
of Delegates, Bill for the Naturalization of Foreigners, NAT’L ARCHIVES (OCT. 14, 
1776), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-01-02-0223 (Jefferson 
substituting “natural born citizens” for “natural born Subjects” in 1776 draft 
legislation). 
340 See supra note 306 and accompanying text. 
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Tillman acknowledges “that historical context matters,” but 
he insists that “legal context is . . . a very substantial element” of 
it.341  He rejects the interpretation of Framers who believed, in a 
related dispute, that a member of Congress holds an “office” 
because they did not provide “a clear reasoned basis for their 
views.”342  In determining the meanings of “office” and “office 
under,” he relies on usual legal sources and analyses like  
Supreme Court precedents;343 textual differences between the 
Constitution and other legal documents, including the Articles of 
Confederation;344 textual differences between alternative 
proposals for the same constitutional provision;345 settled drafting 
conventions;346 intratextual uniformity;347 incongruity of results 
from applying an interpretation to other constitutional provisions 
that use the same term;348 period treatises;349 deference to statutes 
enacted by the First Congress;350 and practices of federal officials 
shortly after the adoption of the Constitution.351 
In the related constitutional dispute, Tillman ultimately 
refers to “the fact (or, better, the legal conclusion) that members of 
Congress” do not hold an “office.”352  He reaches a legal conclusion; 
he does not prove a fact about the meaning of the word.  The 
strength of his argument regarding “office under” relies on legal 
analysis, not on any evidence that the American public thought 
that the Constitution incorporates a British term of art that 
excludes elected offices.  His argument would not suffer at all if 
the British term and practice never existed.  Tillman inclines 
toward Ellesmere’s reliance on a legal interpreter’s learning and 
depth of reason over Bacon’s appeal to common understanding. 
 
341 Seth Barrett Tillman, The Foreign Emoluments Clause—Where the Bodies Are 
Buried: “Idiosyncratic” Legal Positions, 59 S. TEX. L. REV. 237, 247 (2017). 
342 Tillman, supra note 307, at 194. 
343 See, e.g., id. at 198; Tillman, supra note 312, at 59 n.103. 
344 See Tillman, supra note 307, at 195–96. 
345 See id. at 205. 
346 See id. at 196. 
347 See Tillman, supra note 312, at 52. 
348 See, e.g., Tillman, supra note 341, at 244, 265. 
349 See id. at 269–70. 
350 See Tillman, supra note 312, at 59 & n.103 (interpreting “office under” to 
include elected offices would make a statute enacted in the First Congress 
unconstitutional based on the Federalist 60 and a 1969 Supreme Court decision). 
351 See Tillman, supra note 307, at 187–88, 199–200. 
352 Tillman, supra note 312, at 48 (emphasis omitted). 
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b. Definition of Emoluments 
Tillman asserts that “emolument” meant only “the lawfully 
authorized compensation that flows from holding an office or 
employment.”353  Consequently, the Foreign Emoluments Clause, 
for example, precludes “U.S. officers from taking emoluments 
associated with foreign government positions, foreign government 
offices, and foreign government employments (e.g., civil service 
positions).”354  Tillman relies on three principal grounds to assert 
this narrow public meaning of the word.  The first is the Supreme 
Court’s 1850 statement in Hoyt v. United States that the word 
emoluments “embrac[es] every species of compensation or 
pecuniary profit derived from a discharge of the duties of the 
office.”355  The second is that “emoluments” must be limited to the 
lawfully authorized compensation from holding office or 
employment because unlawful payments, such as those that might 
be routed through business transactions, are something 
completely different—bribes.  More specifically, “bribes are illegal, 
and are an enumerated ground for impeachment under Article II, 
Section 4.  Emoluments are lawfully authorized . . . . The two are 
mutually exclusive and governed by different constitutional 
provisions.”356  The third is that the narrow definition must be 
correct because the broad definition of any profit, gain, or 
advantage would prevent a covered official from receiving any 
benefit in states or foreign countries such as marriage, divorce, 
and judicial enforcement of personal rights.357 
Tillman’s definition is superficially unsatisfactory.  The 
Foreign Emoluments Clause specifically forbids accepting foreign 
offices.358  There is no reason to forbid accepting the compensation 
of foreign offices when the clause prohibits accepting the offices in 
the first place; nor is there any reason to forbid accepting the 
compensation of foreign government employment when the clause 
 
353 Brief for Tillman, supra note 309, at 5 (footnote omitted). 
354 Id. at 6. 
355 51 U.S. 109, 135 (1850), quoted in Brief for Tillman, supra note 309, at 5. 
356 Brief for Tillman, supra note 309, at 7 (emphasis omitted). 
357 See Seth Barrett Tillman, Part VI: DC & MD v Trump—Can the  
President of the United States get Married or Divorced?, NEW REFORM CLUB (Mar. 20, 
2019, 6:34 AM), http://reformclub.blogspot.com/2019/03/part-vi-dc-md-v-trumpcan-
president-of.html. 
358 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8 (“[N]o Person holding any Office of Profit or 
Trust under them, shall, without the Consent of the Congress, accept of 
any . . . Office . . . from any King, Prince, or foreign State.”). 
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could simply prohibit accepting employment as it does offices.359  
Moreover, Tillman’s definition creates an unjustified distinction 
between employees and “independent” contractors.  It forbids 
holding a military procurement job in another government’s civil 
service,360 for example, but allows holding a contract to procure the 
same weaponry for the same government (as well as holding 
employment with that same contractor). 
In fact, period usage of “emoluments”—including legal 
usage—is far broader than Tillman’s definition and supports 
interpreting the Domestic and Foreign Emoluments Clauses to 
include business transactions with governments. 
i. Broader Public, Governmental, and Legal Usage 
Founding-era uses of “emolument(s)” included unlawful,361 
unwarrantable,362 and gratuitous363 benefits of individuals as well 
as benefits of non-natural persons that do not hold office or 
employment such as “[t]he church of England,”364 the Bank of 
England,365 and “the united States in congress assembled.”366  In 
the context of government, gratuitous emoluments were 
 
359 See Victoria Nourse, Reclaiming the Constitutional Text from Originalism: The 
Case of Executive Power, 106 CAL. L. REV. 1, 29 (2018); cf., e.g., MD. CONST. § 37 
(1776), reprinted in THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE SEVERAL INDEPENDENT STATES OF 
AMERICA 111 (London, J. Stockdale 1782) (forbidding jointly holding specified 
positions).  
360 See Brief for Tillman, supra note 309, at 6 (prohibition applies to civil service 
jobs as well as government offices). 
361 See infra note 403 and accompanying text. 
362 See infra note 415 and accompanying text; GREAT BRITAIN, supra note 302, at 
329 (“unwarrantable emoluments” taken by troops posted too far away to  
be controlled). 
363 See supra note 301 and accompanying text. “Emoluments” included gratuities 
provided by more than just one’s employer. See 3 GREAT BRITAIN, REPORT RELATIVE 
TO THE MANNER OF PASSING THE ACCOUNTS OF THE CUSTOMS, IN THE OFFICE OF THE 
AUDITORS OF THE IMPREST 247 (1785) (“His other Emoluments are customary 
Gratuities from the Company . . . and from the Passengers upon their Baggage being 
discharged by Sufferance, and from the Officers for their Clearing Stores . . . .”). 
364 See GREAT BRITAIN, supra note 302, at 154. 
365 See An Act for Establishing an Agreement with the Governor and Company of 
the Bank of England, for Advancing the Sum of Three Millions Towards the Supply 
for the Service of the Year One Thousand Eight Hundred, 39 & 40 Geo. 3 c. 28,  
§ 13 (1800). 
366 See An Act to Vest the United States, in Congress Assembled, with Full Power 
to Regulate Trade, and to Enter into Treaties of Commerce, 5 Acts of New Hampshire 
105 (June 23, 1785), reprinted in 21 EARLY STATE PAPERS OF NEW HAMPSHIRE 871 
(Albert Stillman Batchellor ed., Concord, N.H. 1892) (providing that “all the fees 
profits and emoluments, arising from such regulations of Trade and Treaties of 
Commerce shall be appropriated to the sole use of discharging the public debt”). 
730	 ST.	JOHN’S	LAW	REVIEW	 [Vol.	93:683			
particularly subject to abuse.367  Other uses unrelated to labor in 
an employment relationship included emoluments of trade and 
commerce,368 the carrying business,369 markets,370 paper money 
loans,371 conquests,372 battle,373 trades,374 labor generally,375 
inventions,376 publications,377 theatrical performances,378 and 
property including land,379 vineyards,380 wharves,381 and 
buildings.382  In discussing the proposed Foreign Emoluments 
Clause, George Mason pointed out that it would “be difficult to 
know whether [the president] receives emoluments from foreign 
powers or not.”383  That would not have been difficult in the 
 
367 See 1 GREAT BRITAIN, THE REPORTS OF THE COMMISSIONERS APPOINTED TO 
EXAMINE, TAKE, AND STATE THE PUBLIC ACCOUNTS OF THE KINGDOM 111 (London, 
1783) (“The remaining Head is that of Gratuities; a Species of Emolument very liable 
to Abuse . . . The Public Voice unites with that of Individuals, in demanding a 
Suppression of a Species of Emolument so easily perverted to Purposes injurious to 
the Interest of both.”). 
368 15 THE COLONIAL RECORDS OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA 550 (1907) (Journal of 
the Commons House, May 1780). 
369 3 JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON 
THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL 
CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 345 (Philadelphia, 2d ed., 1836) (James 
Madison in the Virginia ratifying convention). 
370 4 CALENDAR OF TREASURY BOOKS AND PAPERS 509 (1901) (Dec. 3, 1741: 
farmers’ market). 
371 Pennsylvania Assembly Committee, Report on the Governor’s Instructions, 
NAT’L ARCHIVES (Sept. 23, 1756), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Franklin/ 
01-06-02-0234. 
372 THE RIGHT HON. EARL T—MPLE, AN ANSWER TO A LETTER TO THE RIGHT 
HONOURABLE THE EARL OF B*** 27 (London, 1761). 
373 John Thomas, Letter from Major General John Thomas to George Washington, 
NAT’L ARCHIVES (May 8, 1776), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/ 
03-04-02-0193.  
374 3 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF 
NATIONS 276–77 (Dublin, 1776). 
375 THOMAS CLARKSON, AN ESSAY ON THE SLAVERY AND COMMERCE OF THE 
HUMAN SPECIES 75 (Philadelphia, 3d ed. 1787). 
376 JAMES RUMSEY, A SHORT TREATISE ON THE APPLICATION OF STEAM 1035 note 
(Philadelphia, 1788). 
377 1 THE COMPANION TO THE PLAY-HOUSE (London, 1764) (within entry for  
“The Mistakes”). 
378 Id. (within entry for “Love-a-la-Mode”). 
379 See Act of Oct. 10, 1785, reprinted in 12 THE STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A 
COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA, FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE 
LEGISLATURE, IN THE YEAR 1619, at 262 (William Waller Hening ed., Richmond, Va., 
G. Cochran 1823) [hereinafter Compact]. 
380 10 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 8726 (Edinburgh, 2d ed., 1783). 
381 See Compact, supra note 379, art. 1, § 7.  
382 See 2 SUFFOLK DEEDS 41 (Boston, Rockwell & Churchill 1883) (1654 
indenture). 
383 ELLIOT, supra note 318, at 484. 
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founding era if “emoluments” meant only lawful payments that the 
president received for personal employment by the foreign 
governments. 
In the context of government, business contracts and their 
benefits were emoluments that people recognized were subject to 
abuse and threatened the survival of representative government.  
Benjamin Franklin noted a taxpayer’s objection to wasteful 
government spending on “Pensions, Salaries, Perquisites, 
Contracts and other Emoluments,” presumably because the 
recipients belonged to a different political party.384  George 
Washington lamented the harm that the “Emolument of the 
Contractors” caused to the American army.385  As early as 1771, 
British reformers criticized the grant of “places, pensions, 
contracts, and other emoluments” to members of the House of 
Commons,386 recognized that those conflicted recipients could not 
“do their duty to the people,”387 and proposed legislation to require 
“that any member who receives a place, pension, contract, lottery 
ticket or any other emolument whatsoever, from the crown, or 
enjoys profit from any such place, pension, &c., shall not only 
vacate his seat, but be absolutely ineligible during his continuance 
under such undue influence.”388 
More ominously, John Adams warned in 1788 that 
emoluments such as government contracts could lead to the 
republic’s downfall in his famous A Defence of the Constitutions of 
 
384 See Benjamin Franklin, From Benjamin Franklin to Mary Stevenson, NAT’L 
ARCHIVES (Sept. 2, 1769), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Franklin/01-16-
02-0110.  
385 See George Washington, From George Washington to Robert Morris, NAT’L 
ARCHIVES (June 16, 1782), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/99-
01-02-08703 (contractors’ tenacious defense of their contractual emoluments 
responsible for “the present deplorable state of the Magazines and the dangerous 
consequences which may flow from it”); cf. George Washington, From George 
Washington to James McHenry, NAT’L ARCHIVES (Dec. 13, 1798), https://founders. 
archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-22-02-0184 (contractors’ primary focus on their 
own profit tends to lead them to supply inferior materials at the wrong location in the 
wrong quantities and thereby “to defeat the best concerted military plans”). 
386 An Historical Essay on the English Constitution, 41 THE GENTLEMAN’S AND 
LONDON MAGAZINE: OR, MONTHLY CHRONOLOGER, 399, 685 (Dublin, 1771). 
387 Reports from the Supporters of the Bill of Rights, 41 THE GENTLEMAN’S AND 
LONDON MAGAZINE: OR, MONTHLY CHRONOLOGER, 491, 491 (Dublin, 1771). 
388 Id. at 492. State lotteries were a major source of revenue for the government 
and were widely criticized as socially harmful. See, e.g., James Raven, The Abolition 
of the English State Lotteries, 34 HIST. J. 371, 371–73 (1991); ANON., LONDON: A 
SATIRE 23 (London, J. Stockdale 1787).  
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Government of the United States of America.389  The majority might 
“bestow all offices, contracts, privileges in commerce, and other 
emoluments” on their supporters “and throw every vexation and 
disappointment in the way of” their opponents until they 
controlled the entire government.390  “The press, that great barrier 
and bulwark of the rights of mankind,” would no longer be free.391  
If its writers and printers accepted the hire that the majority 
offered, they would become “vehicles of calumny against the 
minority, and of panegyric and empirical applauses of the leaders 
of the majority.”392  If not, they would be denounced and ruined.393  
“In one word, the whole system of affairs, and every conceivable 
motive of hope and fear, will be employed to promote the private 
interests of a few, and their obsequious majority: and there is no 
remedy but in arms.”394  Adams’s Defence was well known in the 
United States.395  His message was so powerful that 
Representative Livingston read that section of the Defence aloud 
in the House of Representatives as an example of “how a 
Government, organized like ours, may come to destruction” when 
opposing the Adams administration’s Sedition Act,396 and Joseph 
Story quoted it in his Commentaries.397  Adams’s warning 
resonates today.398 
 
389 3 JOHN ADAMS, A DEFENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONS OF GOVERNMENT OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 284–85 (London, J. Stockdale 1788).  
390 Id. at 284. 




395 See, e.g., The Right Constitution of a Commonwealth Examined, GAZETTE OF 
THE UNITED STATES (New York), July 22, 1789, at 116 (referencing this portion of  
the Defence). 
396 2 UNITED STATES, THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE CONGRESS OF THE 
UNITED STATES 2154–55 (Washington, Gales & Seaton 1851) (debates in July 1798); 
cf. 4 JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE 
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL 
CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 557 (Washington, 2d ed. 1836) (remarks in 
support of the Virginia Resolutions of 1798, insinuating that Federalists were 
“distributing emolument among devoted partizans . . . and deluding the people with 
professions of republicanism”). 
397 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES 31–32 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray, & Co. 1833). 
398 See, e.g., Ken Klippenstein, $300M Puerto Rico Recovery Contract Awarded to 
Tiny Utility Company Linked to Major Trump Donor, DAILY BEAST (Oct. 24, 2017), 
https://www.thedailybeast.com/dollar300m-puerto-rico-recovery-contract-awarded-
to-tiny-utility-company-linked-to-major-trump-donor; Sean Illing, How Fox News 
Evolved into a Propaganda Operation, VOX (Mar. 22, 2019), https://www.vox.com/ 
2019/3/22/18275835/fox-news-trump-propaganda-tom-rosenstiel; Mark Follman, 
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Even in Tillman’s preferred legal context, authorities included 
broad characterizations of business receipts as emoluments, 
including emoluments of trading stocks,399 and of owning a ship,400 
school,401 or intellectual property.402  More specifically, the 
Emoluments Clauses limit the receipt of emoluments, so the most 
apposite period authorities are ones that also limited their receipt.  
Those authorities also used “emoluments” broadly. 
A 1789 statute, the “Treasury Act,” forbade Treasury 
Department officers to take “any emolument or gain for 
negotiating or transacting any business in the said department, 
other than what shall be allowed by law.”403  The word 
“emolument” encompassed receipts from all sources and 
unauthorized receipts.  The statute used two qualifiers to refer to 
the lawfully authorized compensation of the employment 
relationship: “allowed by law” and “for negotiating or transacting 
any business in the said department.”404  A 1795 statute 
establishing the position of Purveyor of Public Supplies contained 
a similar provision.405 
A 1796 statute authorized the president to appoint agents to 
trade on behalf of the United States and forbade the agents, their 
clerks, and their employees to “take, or apply to his or their own 
use, any emolument or gain for negotiating or transacting any 
business or trade, during their agency or employment, other than 
is provided by this act.”406  The word “emolument” encompassed 
business and trade receipts of both persons who had a legal 
relationship with the United States—the appointed agents—and 
 
Trump Continues Stirring Dangerous Hatred of the Media, MOTHER JONES  
(Mar. 10, 2019), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2019/03/trump-continues-
dangerous-attacks-on-media-fake-news-threats/ (denouncing the opposing press as 
“the true Enemy of the People”). 
399 See Morris v. Langdale, 2 Bos. & Pul. 284, 284–85, 126 Eng. Rep. 1284  
(C.P. 1800). 
400 See Grigg v. Stoker, Forrest, 4, 5, 145 Eng. Rep. 1095, 1095 (Ex. 1800). 
401 See Glazebrook v. Woodrow, 8 T. R. 366, 368, 101 Eng. Rep. 1436, 1438  
(K.B 1799).  
402 See Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303, 2358, 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 231 (K.B. 1769).  
403 An Act to Establish the Treasury Department, ch. 12, § 8, 1 Stat. 65, 67  
(1789). For a more detailed analysis of this statute, see infra notes 539–541 and 
accompanying text. 
404 Id. 
405 See An Act to Establish the Office of Purveyor of Public Supplies, ch. 27, § 2, 2 
Stat. 419, 419 (1795). 
406 An Act for Establishing Trading Houses with the Indian Tribes, ch. 13,  
§§ 2–3, 1 Stat. 452, 452 (1796). 
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those who had none—their clerks and employees.407  The statute 
required the qualifying clauses “for negotiating or transacting any 
business or trade” to tailor the word’s scope to receipts from 
specified transactions and “other than is provided by this act” to 
restrict its scope to lawfully authorized receipts.408  An 1806 
statute contained similar provisions.409 
All of these statutes imposed duties of good faith and used 
qualifiers to narrow the broad scope of the word “emoluments.”  
The text of the Emoluments Clauses demonstrates the effect of 
qualifiers.  The Congressional Emoluments Clause applies to an 
“Office . . . the Emoluments whereof shall have been encreased.”410  
The qualifier “whereof” is necessary to restrict the broad meaning 
of “emoluments” to those of the office.  The Domestic and Foreign 
Emoluments Clauses do not contain any such qualifier, so respect 
for the text requires them to apply more expansively.  Tillman 
acknowledges that prepositions like “of” have meaning in 
constitutional interpretation.411  Similarly, he argues that “office” 
alone has a broader constitutional meaning than “office under” 
because “modifying phrases like under the United States work a 
limitation on what would otherwise be the more expansive 
category, office, unmodified.”412 
Other authorities prohibited or voided the receipt of 
emoluments in the more expansive sense of the word and generally 
imposed duties of good faith.  A 1779 Virginia statute recognized 
that many tax collectors had misapplied tax revenues for “private 
purposes in speculative bargains for the emolument of themselves 
or their friends” to the detriment of the public, and in response 
imposed forfeitures on any who did so in the future.413 
A 1780 Virginia statute required certain officials to swear an 
oath that “I will not, directly or indirectly, by myself, or any person 
or persons whatsoever, dispose or make use of such [public] money, 
 
407 See id.  
408 Id. 
409 See An Act for Establishing Trading Houses with the Indian Tribes, ch. 48, § 6, 
1 Stat. 402, 403 (1806) (including a qualifier “excepting for or on account of the United 
States,” demonstrating that the word “emolument” encompassed receipts for 
non-employees such as the United States itself). 
410 See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 6, cl. 2. 
411 See Tillman, supra note 312, at 54. 
412 See id. at 76 (footnote omitted). 
413 An Act to Prevent the Misapplication of the Money Collected for Taxes, ch. 38, 
§ 1 (1779), reprinted in 10 THE STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE 
LAWS OF VIRGINIA, FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE, IN THE YEAR 1619, 
at 199 (William Waller Hening ed., Richmond, Va., G. Cochran 1822). 
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or any part thereof, for my own emolument, or the emolument of 
any other person, for private purposes, other than my legal 
commission . . . .”414 
A 1755 British statute recognized the distress suffered by 
retired veterans who received their pensions in arrears and 
consequently had to borrow in advance from lenders who imposed 
“terms many times oppressive and usurious, to the extreme 
detriment of” the pensioners “and to the unwarrantable 
emoluments of” the lenders.415  Parliament voided all of the 
pensioners’ existing and future assignments, contracts, and 
security for monies to become due,416 and accelerated payment of 
their pensions.417 
A 1797 British statute limited the types of businesses that 
could hold licenses to sell liquor and provided that “any license 
which shall be granted to any person . . . having any interest, 
emolument, or profit in or out of any other trade or 
business . . . shall be, and the same is hereby declared null and 
void” and imposed penalties on those whose licenses were so 
voided.418  
Finally, British reformers succeeded in enacting a standalone 
statute in 1782 specifically forbidding the receipt of the 
emoluments of government contracts in order to prevent conflicts 
of interest and ensure the survival of representative 
government.419  These authorities demonstrate that period legal 
restrictions used “emoluments” broadly. 
ii. Conflicts of Interest 
Tillman asserts an unnecessary dichotomy between bribery 
and lawful employment compensation.  Emoluments create issues 
other than bribery, including issues of good faith involved in the 
 
414 An Act to Empower the High Sheriffs to Proceed in a Summary Way Against 
their Deputies, and for Other Purposes, ch. 11 § 4 (1780), reprinted in 10 THE 
STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA, FROM THE 
FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE, IN THE YEAR 1619, at 256 (William Waller 
Hening ed., Richmond, Va., G. Cochran 1822). 
415 An Act for the Relief of the Out-Pensioners of the Royal Hospital at Chelsea, 
28 Geo. 2 c. 1, pmbl. (1755). 
416 See id. at § 1. 
417 See id. at § 2.  
418 An Act for Regulating the Issuing of Licenses for the Sale of Wine, Ale, Beer, 
Cider, and Spirituous Liquors by Retail, and for Preventing the Immoderate Use of 
Spirituous Liquors, 37 Geo. 3 c. 45, § 7 (1797). 
419 See infra Section VI.B.2.b; infra note 511 and accompanying text (prohibition 
required to prevent the ruin of Britain and to secure its constitution in the future). 
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statutes from 1755 to 1806 described above.420  In particular, the 
1782 reform statute discussed in Section VI.B.2.b below prohibited 
emoluments from honest business transactions with government, 
even though they were not bribes, because they create conflicts of 
interest that threaten public trust and the survival of 
representative government. 
iii. Purposive Interpretation 
Tillman also asserts an unnecessary dichotomy between the 
critics’ broad definition and his narrow one, as Randy E. Barnett 
does between broad and narrow meanings of “commerce.”  There 
is no objective reason to require an interpreter to choose between 
two historical proper definitions or to require judges to create their 
own proper definitions and defend them in all conceivable 
contexts.  
The authorities described above used “emoluments” broadly 
to prevent conflicts of interest and ensure public trust.  Hoyt 
analyzed acts of Congress involving specific types of compensation 
for a particular government official.421  The Court determined the 
reach of the term “emoluments” based on “the obvious import of it 
in these acts.”422  The opinion did not provide an exclusive 
definition of the term, but instead explained the use to which 
particular statutes put it. 
Another nineteenth-century decision, Queen v. Postmaster-
General,423 interpreted the term even more narrowly than Hoyt 
based on statutory purpose.  Expense reimbursements were 
generally considered to be emoluments.424  One statute at issue in 
Hoyt imposed a cap on “the annual emoluments of any collector of 
the customs, after deducting therefrom the expenditures incident 
to his office.”425  Congress used “emoluments” broadly and 
expressly allowed collectors to deduct expenses from their 
emoluments before applying the cap.  The statute at issue in 
 
420 See supra notes 403–409, 413–418 and accompanying text. 
421 Legal Historians, supra note 285, at 20 n.72. 
422 Hoyt v. United States, 51 U.S. 109, 135 (1850). 
423 47 L.J.R. 435 (Eng. Q.B. 1878) (Bramwell, L.J.). 
424 Robert G. Natelson, The Original Meaning of “Emoluments” in the 
Constitution, 52 GA. L. REV. 1, 15 (2017) (noting the term was generally included in 
definition 1 unless implicitly excluded by separate enumeration in certain variants); 
id. at 15–16 (noting that definition 2 generally includes all items in definition 1).  
425 An Act to Amend “An Act to Establish the Compensations of the Officers 
Employed in the Collection of the Duties on Imports and Tonnage; and for Other 
Purposes”, ch. 37, § 3, 2 Stat. 316 (1802) (setting the compensation of customs officers). 
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Postmaster-General granted terminated officers an annuity equal 
to a proportion of “the annual Emolument derived by him from his 
Office” as “Compensation for the Loss of his Office.”426  This statute 
did not expressly provide for deducting reimbursed expenses.  A 
terminated officer sought to include his travel expense allowance 
in calculating his annuity, but the Court refused, interpreting 
“emoluments” more narrowly based on the purpose of the 
statute.427  As one judge opined: 
I must say that the case is a very plain one.  The object of the 
statute was to indemnify a man from the loss of the emoluments 
he derived from the office; I can use no other words.  The next 
question is, what is an emolument? . . . Surely you would first 
deduct what he had to expend for travelling.428 
Aquinas reminds us that we must consider the meaning to 
which words are put.429  Statutes used a broad meaning of 
“emoluments” when preventing conflicts of interest and ensuring 
public trust.  The statutes involved in Hoyt used a narrower 
meaning to calculate the statutorily authorized compensation of a 
particular officer while in office.  And the statute at issue in 
Postmaster-General used the term even more narrowly to calculate 
statutorily authorized compensation for the loss of an office.  There 
were many period uses of “emoluments,” and the interpretive issue 
is the meaning to which the Constitution puts the word.  This is 
one of purpose, not linguistics. 
2. Robert G. Natelson’s Approach 
a. Emoluments 
Robert G. Natelson provides an even more elaborate 
exposition of the original meaning of “emolument.”  He surveys 
eighteenth-century usage including etymology,430 dictionary 
definitions,431 and a variety of what he characterizes as “official,”432 
as opposed to “general,”433 uses of the word prior to the final 
 
426 See Telegraph Act, 31 & 32 Vict. c. 110, § 8(7) (1868). 
427 Postmaster-General, 47 L.J.R. at 435. 
428 Id. (allowing the officer to include only the excess of his fixed expense 
allowance over his actual travel expenses). 
429 See supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
430 Natelson, supra note 424, at 18 n.68. 
431 Id. (citing multiple period dictionaries). 
432 Id. at 10; cf. id. at 19 (“My impression from the foregoing survey is that in 
official discourse (as opposed to general discourse), Definition No. 1 was the most 
common use and Definition No. 4 the least.”). 
433 Id. at 18. 
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ratification of the Constitution.  He focuses on “official British and 
American founding-era discourse”434 generally, and “British 
parliamentary and American legislative records” specifically.435 
He determines that the word had four possible definitions in 
official usage at adoption: (1) “fringe benefits of financial value by 
reason of public employment,” (2) “all compensation of financial 
value by reason of public employment,” (3) “proceeds of financial 
value from gainful activity,” and (4) “all benefits or advantages.”436 
Using only materials from before May 29, 1790—the day the 
thirteenth state ratified the Constitution—to avoid 
anachronism,437 Natelson analogizes to prior state laws and 
constitutions,438 the Articles of Confederation,439 and American 
and British political reform statutes because Americans and 
Britons “were part of the same linguistic and social community” in 
1787.440  He uses rules of legal construction, purposive 
interpretation, and the rule of reason in considering the four 
potential definitions.441  He considers the practical consequences 
of the four potential definitions for what he calls the five “top-tier 
value[s]” that “the constitution-makers” shared and used to make 
the Constitution: public trust (anti-corruption), “republican 
government (including citizen control), effective government, the 
natural rights of individuals, and decentralization (federalism and 
local and individual autonomy).”442 
He notes that the Constitution’s five top-tier values 
sometimes conflicted and argues that, when they did, the 
constitution-makers balanced and compromised them rather than 
elevating a single value over the others.443  He examines the 
 
434 Id. at 10. 
435 Id. at 12. 
436 Id. at 13–19. Natelson acknowledges that each had variants, illustrating “how 
inexact the word could be.” Id. at 13. One might argue that Natelson confounds 
definition with designation—that his four “definitions” and their variants merely 
represent a few of the many gains, advantages or profits that writers of the period 
describe as emoluments. See infra notes 363–382 and accompanying text for the large 
variety of uses, including “official” uses in statutes and legislative histories. 
437 See Natelson, supra note 424, at 10–11. 
438 See id. at 24. 
439 See id. at 26. 
440 Id. at 19. 
441 See id. at 54 (“rules of legal construction, the historical events that necessitated 
the Clause, the lack of historical events suggesting a broader interpretation, and the 
fact that it was literally impossible to apply the fourth definition to any office holder 
who served abroad”). 
442 Id. at 8–9 (footnote omitted). 
443 See id. at 9. 
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practical consequences of each potential definition for minimizing 
corruption,444 attracting capable people from the private sector to 
government service,445 and minimizing the size of the federal 
government.446 
In particular, Natelson examines these values in the context 
of the eighteenth-century British reform movement.  He claims 
that the reform movement focused on emoluments received by 
reason of public service.  “Reformers sought to save public money 
by trimming” perquisites of public office and to “make the 
government fairer and more effective by shifting compensation 
away from” perquisites to salaries.447  He asserts that complaints 
about financial proceeds from gainful activities “do not appear” in 
the reform movement,448 that the reforms were not radical but 
instead were moderate, with other values tempering the reform 
fervor,449 and that there were “no historical incidents that would 
have induced the founders to apply a construction that included 
honest business transactions or other” emoluments from gainful 
activities.450 
Natelson asserts that the founding generation would have 
reasoned that the top-tier value of effective government requires 
the services of people who “have proven their mettle in the private 
sector” and who will find government service attractive.451  “A 
wealthy merchant might be an asset to Congress even if his 
attention was occasionally diverted from federal affairs to his own 
private concerns.”452  Such people will need assurances that 
government service will not ruin them by forbidding them to 
benefit from government transactions.453  For example, “everyone 
knew that tobacco growers were likely future candidates for the 
 
444 See id. at 46. 
445 See id. at 47–49. 
446 See id. 
447 Id. at 27. 
448 See id. But see, e.g., infra notes 487–489 and accompanying text (the reform 
movement deliberately targeted financial proceeds from honest business transactions 
with government). 
449 See Natelson, supra note 424, at 23–24. But see, e.g., infra notes 484–486 and 
accompanying text (reform of business transactions with government was radical and 
recognized as such at the time). 
450 Natelson, supra note 424, at 53. But see, e.g., infra notes 505–509 and 
accompanying text (a primary historical incident was the British prosecution of war 
against America). 
451 Natelson, supra note 424, at 31. 
452 Id. at 32. But see, e.g., infra notes 508–511 and accompanying text (the issue 
is conflict of interest, not inattention). 
453 See Natelson, supra note 424, at 32, 49. 
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presidency,” and forbidding the president to transact with state 
governments would require tobacco growers to sell their land or 
leave it fallow because several important states required tobacco 
transactions to be conducted through state warehouses.454 
Ultimately, Natelson argues that the written Constitution 
resulted from this process of balance and compromise,455 that “the 
final document crystalized the results,”456 and that “[i]t is 
unfaithful to the Constitution for us to re-balance what the 
framers and ratifiers have already adjusted.”457  He utilizes a 
process of elimination to consider the four potential definitions and 
concludes that the Constitution crystalized a narrow definition of 
emoluments: “compensation with financial value received by 
reason of public office, including salary and fringe benefits.  
Proceeds from unrelated market transactions were outside the 
scope of the term.”458  Natelson’s use of “crystalize” is noteworthy.  
It is often used figuratively to mean “[t]o cause to become concrete 
or fixed; to make clear and defined.”459  Natelson’s position is like 
that of the 1608 novelists:  we have a “certain known law” that we 
must enforce without being subject to the “alterable discretion of 
any judges.”460 
Natelson’s approach is generally pluralist.  It uses many of the 
interpretive methods that Ellesmere identifies: historical, 
definitional, etymological, analogical, and practical.  It identifies a 
broad scope for context.  It is not restricted to American law, but 
relies heavily on foreign law.  In order to determine the meaning 
of constitutional terms, the interpreter must consider British 
social, political, and legal history, including specific British 
statutes.  Notably, by focusing on “official” uses of “emoluments” 
and a full range of legal analysis, he follows Tillman in departing 




454 See id. at 49. But see, e.g., infra notes 514–516 and accompanying text (the 
reform movement considered but rejected an exception that would have allowed the 
sale of produce of a member’s own estates). 
455 See Natelson, supra note 424, at 9. 
456 Id. 
457 Id. 
458 Id. at 55. 
459 Crystallize, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, def. 3.a (2019), https://www.oed. 
com/view/Entry/45399?redirectedFrom=crystallize#eid.  
460 Case of the Union of the Realm of Scotland with England (1608), 2 How. St. 
Tr. at 569 (Popham, C.J.).  
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sources that Natelson relies on and the analyses that he conducts 
are unlikely to be the grounds for how the American public 
determined the meaning of “emoluments.” 
Natelson’s approach requires the identification and balancing 
of values that the Constitution does not enumerate or rank.  It 
requires the interpreter to identify and balance contending 
fundamental principles considered in drafting and ratifying the 
Constitution, including natural rights and federalism.  It relies on 
the rule of reason in considering the potential consequences of a 
given definition for the five top-tier values. 
This approach is consistent with coherence theories of 
interpretation like that of Ronald M. Dworkin.461  An 
interpretation should fit with the relevant legal materials and 
provide a justification of them in a theory of political morality.462  
This creates a strong role for political morality in legal 
interpretation.  As a result, Natelson ultimately reasons 
backwards like Barnett.  The objective public meaning of the 
constitutional text does not reveal the balance that the 
constitution-makers struck.  Rather, the balance that Natelson 
believes they struck reveals the meaning of the text.  Natelson’s 
approach, like Barnett’s, is similar to a target of Michael Stokes 
Paulsen’s criticism of pluralism: identifying an abstract principle 
in the Constitution, assigning it a specific content based on the 
interpreter’s own discernment, then infusing that content into 
particular constitutional provisions.463 
It is the opposite of Tillman’s approach, however.  Tillman 
requires one to “first tease out the precise metes and bounds of” a 
clause before determining the significance of any principle 
underlying it.464  Natelson appeals to underlying principles to 
tease out the metes and bounds of the word “emoluments.”  This 
reflects the recurring issue in linguistic analysis of whether it is 
possible to determine textual clarity as an independent fact 
without knowing the speaker’s purpose.465 
 
461 Cf. Kenneth J. Kress, Legal Reasoning and Coherence Theories: Dworkin’s 
Rights Thesis, Retroactivity, and the Linear Order of Decisions, 72 CAL. L. REV. 369, 
370 (1984). 
462 See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 246–47 (1986); Ronald Dworkin, 
“Natural” Law Revisited, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 165, 171 (1982); John C. Vlahoplus, 
Understanding Dworkin, 1 GEO. MASON INDEP. L. REV. 153, 210–11 (1993). 
463 See Paulsen, supra note 13, at 878–79. 
464 Tillman, supra note 312, at 28. 
465 See supra notes 141–143 and accompanying text. 
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Natelson’s approach diverges from Dworkin’s in two features, 
which reflect the core of originalism: an acute focus on history, 
limiting consideration to materials from before May 29, 1790, and 
a prohibition on interpreters using their own normative judgment 
to identify and balance top-tier values.  Natelson purports to 
objectively identify founding-era values and the balance that the 
constitution-makers struck. 
Natelson’s approach is superficially unappealing.  There is no 
reason for the Foreign Emoluments Clause to forbid accepting the 
compensation of foreign offices when the clause prohibits 
accepting the offices in the first place.466  Natelson’s approach also 
falls short on fit and the balancing of the purported top-tier values.  
The top-tier value of saving the federal government money does 
not justify the Foreign Emoluments Clause.  The Foreign 
Emoluments Clause can only save foreign governments money.  
The prohibition on states providing emoluments to the president 
in the Domestic Emoluments Clause violates the top-tier value of 
decentralization/federalism.  Each state should be allowed to 
determine how to spend its budget.467  Only the public trust value 
justifies both of these prohibitions.  Only assigning the public trust 
value great weight justifies it outweighing the top-tier value of 
decentralization/federalism in the Domestic Emoluments Clause. 
In addition, Natelson arbitrarily limits the interpreter to 
considering four definitions and using a process of elimination to 
choose among them.  As discussed above, there are many broader 
official period uses of the word, including legal uses prohibiting or 
voiding the receipt of emoluments interpreted broadly.468  There is 
no need to limit a proposed constitutional definition of 
“emoluments” to a single source of benefits.  Just as Barnett 
concludes that “commerce” includes navigation and 
transportation, so too might “emoluments” include both 
compensation of an office and benefits derived from business 
 
466 See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9, cl. 8 (“[N]o Person holding any Office of Profit or 
Trust under them, shall, without the Consent of the Congress, accept of 
any . . . Office . . . from any King, Prince, or foreign State.”). 
467 Natelson notes that on balancing grounds the Congressional Emoluments 
Clause does not forbid members of Congress to hold state offices. See Natelson, supra 
note 424, at 35–36. This respects decentralization and federalism. A general 
prohibition on the president receiving emoluments from the states, however, can only 
be justified on public trust grounds; otherwise the Constitution would allow each state 
to determine whether it wanted to provide emoluments to the president, just as it 
allows each state to determine whether members of Congress can hold state office. 
468 See supra notes 403–409, 413–419 and accompanying text. 
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transactions with government while in office—the specific target 
of emoluments litigation against President Trump.  The 
Anglo-American reform movement targeted the emoluments of 
even honest business contracts with the government because they 
created a conflict of interest and threatened public trust and the 
survival of representative government.469  Crucially, the reform 
movement targeted them because they caused Britain to protract 
the war against the United States, impeding all efforts at peace.470 
b. Emoluments and the Reform Movement 
The reform movement’s lessons are the opposite of those that 
Natelson draws, specifically as they relate to business 
transactions with government.  Three principal reform examples 
are the 1782 British Contractor’s Act, the 1789 Treasury Act, and 
the 1808 American Public Contracts Act. 
In 1782, after many years of reform agitation,471 Parliament 
passed “An Act for restraining any Person concerned in any 
Contract, Commission, or Agreement made for the Publick Service 
from being elected or sitting and voting as a Member of the House 
of Commons” (the “Contractor’s Act”).472  The prohibition was 
“exceedingly popular” with the public because of their “general 
odium” toward elected representatives who had business contracts 
with the government.473  Section 1 of the act disqualified anyone 
who enjoyed any “emolument arising from” a government contract 
from sitting or voting in the House of Commons.474  Section 2 
voided the seat of any member who violated the act,475 and Section 
9 disqualified violators from ever receiving any “emolument” from 





469 See infra notes 504–512, 389–394 and accompanying text. 
470 See infra note 505 and accompanying text. 
471 See, e.g., supra notes 386–388 (1771 complaints and proposals). 
472 22 Geo. 3 c. 45 (1782). 
473 See JOHN HUTTON, THE ANNUAL REGISTER, OR A VIEW OF THE HISTORY, 
POLITICS, AND LITERATURE FOR THE YEAR 1778, at 176 (London, J. Dodsley eds.,  
4th ed. 1800). 
474 22 Geo. 3 c. 45, § 1 (1782). 
475 See id. at § 2. 
476 See id. at § 9. 
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The act had only one purpose: “securing the freedom and 
independence of Parliament.”477  An Albany newspaper reported in 
1782 that the act would “purify the popular representation in 
Parliament.”478  The act targeted conflicts of interest, not vote 
trading or bribes.479  As David Hartley, M.P. wrote, “[t]he 
greatness and dignity of this kingdom require that the constitution 
of its Parliament should be not only uncorrupt, but 
unsuspected.”480  The act applied to honest contracts,481 contracts 
for the sale of produce of a member’s own estates,482 and contracts 
for the exercise of a member’s own profession.483 
The act easily passed the House of Commons but initially 
faced stiff opposition in the House of Lords.  Opponents recognized 
that the act was radical.  One characterized the bill’s supporters 
as “mad from virtue” and insisted that the House of Lords had a 
“duty to check and resist that delirium of virtue, that rage and 
tempest of liberty, and bring them back to coolness and 
sobriety.”484  Another asserted that proponents “were violently 
bent on purifying” the House of Commons.485  One of the 
Secretaries of State was himself almost delirious in opposition: 
 
477 Id. at pmbl. At least one opponent of the Contractor’s Act recognized that it did 
nothing to save the government money. See, e.g., 21 GREAT BRITAIN, THE 
PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND 436–37 (London, Lord Chancellor ed. 1814) 
(1780) (“[W]hat is the benefit to be derived to the state? None at all. The object of 
œconomy is abandoned in the instant it is declared to be the only one; for it does not 
pretend to put an end to corrupt contracts, because they may continue to be made as 
formerly, but only to prevent the supposed influence arising from it in the other 
House . . . .”). The British reform movement did seek to make government more 
economical. However, Parliament enacted separate legislation to pursue that goal 
while also further securing the independence of Parliament. See, e.g., An Act for 
Enabling his Majesty to Discharge the Debt Contracted upon his Civil List Revenues; 
and for Preventing the Same from Being in Arrear for the Future, by Regulating the 
Mode of Payments out of the Said Revenues, and by Suppressing or Regulating 
Certain Offices Therein Mentioned, Which are now Paid out of the Revenues of the 
Civil List, 22 Geo. 3 c. 82, pmbl. (1782) (“for introducing a better . . . œconomy . . . and 
for the better security of the liberty and independency of Parliament”); Archibald S. 
Foord, The Waning of ‘The Influence of the Crown’, 62 ENG. HIST. REV. 484, 491 (1947); 
Natelson, supra note 424, at 16 n.55 (describing subsequent legislation). 
478 NEW-YORK GAZETTEER, OR, NORTHERN INTELLIGENCER (Albany, N.Y.), Oct. 
28, 1782, at 1 (explanation by the Right Hon. Charles J. Fox, M.P.). 
479 See infra notes 504–516 and accompanying text. 
480 DAVID HARTLEY, TWO LETTERS FROM D. HARTLEY, ESQ. M.P. ADDRESSED TO 
THE COMMITTEE OF THE COUNTY OF YORK 6 (London, J. Almon 1780). 
481 See infra note 487 and accompanying text. 
482 See infra note 488 and accompanying text. 
483 See infra note 499 and accompanying text. 
484 GREAT BRITAIN, supra note 477, at 417 (the Earl of Hillsborough). 
485 Id. at 1390 (Colonel Onslow). 
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A phrenzy of virtue, he said, began to shew itself in the House of 
Commons.  The people had run mad, and the infection was 
gaining upon their representatives.  It would therefore be the 
duty of the Lords to interfere in their controuling capacity, to 
stand in the gap, as he expressed himself, and to prevent the 
other branch of the Legislature from adopting a reformation that 
was only grounded on the visionary complaints of an over 
pampered people.486 
Opponents recognized that the act reached honest and fair 
contracts,487 forbade sales of the produce of one’s own estates,488 
and would either drive successful merchants out of service in the 
House of Commons or cause them to give up their government 
contracts and become economically dependent on the government 
administration.489  Opponents made many of the same arguments 
as Tillman, Natelson, and President Trump, including that 
government service should be made attractive to those who are 
successful in business490 and that the proposal was unnecessary 
because other laws already policed impropriety in government 
contracting.491 
The opponents’ arguments are remarkably contemporary.  
Lord Viscount Stormont argued that it was cruel and unjust “to 
exclude merchants of great property, merely because they 
happened to be engaged, fairly and openly, with government: for 
unless proof was brought to the contrary, their Lordships must 
 
486 THOMAS LEWIS O’BEIRNE, A SHORT HISTORY OF THE LAST SESSION OF 
PARLIAMENT, WITH REMARKS 79 (London, J. Almon & J. Debrett eds., 1780). This may 
have been the Earl of Hillsborough, who was a Secretary of State at the time. See Hill, 
Wills, 1st Earl of Hillsborough [I] (1718–93), of North Aston, Oxon., HIST. OF 
PARLIAMENT ONLINE, http://www.historyofparliamentonline.org/volume/1754-1790/ 
member/hill-wills-1718-93 (last visited Oct. 20, 2019). 
487 See, e.g., 14 GREAT BRITAIN, THE PARLIAMENTARY REGISTER 218 (1802) (Lord 
Viscount Stormont, 1779). 
488 See, e.g., GREAT BRITAIN, supra note 477, at 1391 (Sir P.J. Clerke). 
489 See, e.g., GREAT BRITAIN, supra note 487, at 219 (Lord Viscount Stormont); 
GREAT BRITAIN, supra note 477, at 1390 (Colonel Onslow). 
490 See, e.g., id. at 1392 (Sir P.J. Clerke) (“He wished to see merchants in that 
House: he considered them as the most respectable men, when they came there 
independent, with the virtuous intention of guarding the commercial welfare of the 
kingdom.”); id. at 1390 (Colonel Onslow) (merchants were “one of the fittest 
descriptions of people to sit in” the Commons); cf. GREAT BRITAIN, supra note 487, at 
225 (Earl Bathurst) (“none but men of property and character were at all fitted for” 
the trust of government contracts); supra notes 451–454 and accompanying text 
(Natelson argument). 
491 See, e.g., 5 ADAM ANDERSON, ANDERSON’S HISTORICAL AND CHRONOLOGICAL 
DEDUCTION OF THE ORIGIN OF COMMERCE, FROM THE EARLIEST ACCOUNTS 392 
(Dublin, William Coombe 1790); GREAT BRITAIN, supra note 487, at 219; supra note 
356 and accompanying text (Tillman argument). 
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suppose that the contracts were fair and beneficial.”492  He argued 
against laying “a general stigma, disgrace, and punishment” on 
contractors without proof of their guilt,493 noting that if any 
contract were “proved, at any time, to be founded in fraud and 
imposition, the laws had already provided proper punishment for 
public as well as private delinquency.”494  He hoped that the House 
of Lords “would never give into the popular prejudice, that because 
men enjoyed places of emolument and profit under government, 
they were not left at liberty to act agreeable to their own 
consciences but were rendered dependant on administration.”495  
He acknowledged that an earlier Parliament had prohibited tax 
gatherers from sitting in the House of Commons but opposed 
extending that precedent because of the special circumstances of 
that group:  “[T]hey were in general needy men, and consequently 
more liable to corruption.”496 
The Earl of Hillsborough opposed the bill as unjust for 
presuming that Members of Parliament would put their own 
interests ahead of the nation’s.497  “Could their lordships imagine 
that men of the first families and fortune in the country could be 
so blind to the true interests of their families, and so insensible of 
character, as to prefer the paltry consideration of a temporary 
emolument to the welfare of their country?”498 
Similarly, the Lord Chancellor attacked the proposal as 
prejudiced for assuming that members would favor their own 
interests over the nation’s, as overbroad, and as unjust for 
indiscriminately denying members of the House of Commons the 
right to honestly earn emoluments that the general public was 
entitled to earn: 
It would, besides, be an act of pre-judgment . . . . [T]he remedy 
proposed was a general one, of constant, fixed, and extensive 
operation; not pointed to this or that particular abuse, but a 
general pretended reform . . . . Consider the matter again, in 
respect of actual inconvenience; how pregnant with evil would 
the present measure, if adopted, prove?  And still more so, how 
full of injustice?  Here is a man . . . of considerable fortune, and 
 
492 GREAT BRITAIN, supra note 487, at 218. 
493 Id. at 219.  
494 ANDERSON, supra note 491, at 392; see also GREAT BRITAIN, supra note 487,  
at 219. 
495 GREAT BRITAIN, supra note 487, at 219. 
496 Id. at 218. 
497 GREAT BRITAIN, supra note 477, at 417. 
498 Id. at 418. 
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engaged in great mercantile concerns; this man happens likewise 
to be a member of the other House, and of course is in a situation 
of a distinguished nature, because he is presumed to be acting for 
the good of his country, and a sound presumption, till the 
contrary be proved.  But what says this Bill, but that the 
man . . . must be . . . excluded from deriving from an honest and 
fair pursuit and exercise of his profession, those emoluments 
every person in the kingdom is intitled to, who does not stand in 
the same predicament with himself.  Such is the absurd idea the 
Bill proceeds on, that the person thus engaged in the active 
service of his country, is forbidden the advantages which, if not 
engaged in that service, he might partake of in common with 
others.499 
Opponents argued in part from socio-economic prejudices.  
Colonel Onslow asserted that merchants were “one of the fittest 
descriptions of people to sit in” the Commons and that “he had 
rather at any time sit down with a gentleman than with his 
footman.  If the Bill passed, all the respectable and wealthy men 
would stay out of parliament, and they would send their servants 
and dependents to that House.”500  He urged that those who 
wanted to purify parliament should start by expelling those 
members who were elected solely because of their oratory and who 
had combined together in gangs with a lawyer at their head, 
creating mischief and impeding government operations.501 
Despite all of these objections, the Lords ultimately deferred 
to the people.  Proponents’ arguments in favor of the act are 
remarkably contemporary as well.  The Earl of Shelburne 
characterized the opponents’ view cynically:  “A noble earl had 
said, that men would argue with themselves:  ‘What, shall I be 
base enough for the paltry consideration of a little dirty 
emolument, to give up the interest of my country for my own?’ ”502  
Shelburne insisted that the contractor would reason quite 
differently:  “What, shall I be silly enough to give up my own 
interest, and the interest of my family and posterity for the empty 
and nonsensical motives of public spirit, honour, and integrity?”503  
Shelburne insisted that “Contracts were indisputably a great 
temptation, and therefore he wished to put them out of the  
 
 
499 Id. at 436 (Lord Chancellor). 
500 Id. at 1390. 
501 Id. at 1390–91. 
502 Id. at 425. 
503 Id. 
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way of members of parliament.  For, notwithstanding the 
declaration . . . that men of honour were superior to all influence 
from contracts, human nature spoke a different language.”504 
The conflict of interest inherent in government contracts 
drove contractors in Parliament to support the war against the 
United States.  The Right Honourable Charles J. Fox explained 
that British “ministers found it necessary to protract the war, to 
avoid every tendency to pacification, because they knew that the 
American war was necessary to their continuance in power.”505  
Members of parliament who benefitted from “the emoluments of 
contracts” accepted the ministers’ “monstrous and incredible” 
assertions about the war506 and supported its continuation.  A 
leading minister had no doubt told “his friends, that their 
payment, like his own bread, depended on the American war.”507 
As Lord Shelburne further described the contractor’s 
argument to himself: 
Shall I vote for the conclusion of the present war when I am 
making my fortune by its continuance?  My vote, were I so 
inclined, cannot do any great good.  I could not gain the question 
for my country.  Why, then, should I be so inattentive to myself 
as to overlook the present opportunity?508 
The proposal offered both parliamentary independence and 
the means for ending the American war.  As David Hartley,  
M.P. wrote: 
Pensions, Places, exorbitant emoluments, sinecures, contracts, 
and all such instruments of corruption for the purpose of 
establishing a ministerial influence in Parliament, are 
abominations at all times, but the greatest of all our evils now is 
the continuation of the American war.  The restoration of peace 
with America, and of independence to Parliament, may go hand 
in hand together . . . .509 
The Contractor’s Act did not target bribery, dishonest 
contracts, or classic trading of votes for benefits.  It targeted 
simple conflict of interest.510  As Hartley wrote in 1780 supporting 
 
504 Id. at 425–26. 




508 GREAT BRITAIN, supra note 477, at 425. 
509 HARTLEY, supra note 480, at 20. 
510 This underlying purpose should resonate with Natelson. He notes its 
application to the Impeachment Clause, under which “high misdemeanors encompass 
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the proposal:  “[N]o other remedy under Heaven, can rescue this 
unhappy country from immediate ruin, or re-establish its future 
constitution in security, but a FREE and INDEPENDENT 
PARLIAMENT.  The greatness and dignity of this kingdom require 
that the constitution of its Parliament should be not only 
uncorrupt, but unsuspected.”511  Parliament recognized that 
government contracts created a conflict of interest even though 
they did not guarantee a profit, as the American press reported.512 
The risk that the conflict of interest posed was so great that 
Parliament considered but rejected proposals to exempt contracts 
awarded through public bidding513 and contracts for the sale of 
produce of a member’s own estates.514  The latter proposal would 
have enabled “Gentlemen to sell the growth of their own estates; 
and thereby confining the disqualification to those middle men, 
between the growers and manufacturers on the one part, and the 
consumers on the other, who contract for the supply of 
materials.”515  Some supported that proposed exemption because 
“it would be exceedingly hard that such Gentlemen should be 
deprived of the opportunity of serving the Public.”516  Despite the 
concern for those gentlemen, Parliament rejected the proposed 
exemption. 
The Contractor’s Act was as radical as opponents 
characterized it.  It applied to anyone who received, in whole or in 
part, any “emolument arising from” any government contract, 
agreement, or commission for or on account of the public service, 
whether directly, indirectly, in trust or on his behalf.517  It covered 
contracts in effect at enactment and those that devolved upon  
the member by descent, limitation or marriage, or as an 
 
breaches of the duties of loyalty, good faith, and care.” Robert G. Natelson, 
Impeachment: The Constitution’s Fiduciary Meaning of “High . . . Misdemeanors”,  
19 FED. SOC. REV. 68, 72 (2018). 
511 HARTLEY, supra note 480, at 6.  
512 ROYAL AMERICAN GAZETTE (New York), July 23, 1782, at 2. 
513 See, e.g., GREAT BRITAIN, supra note 477, at 417 (proposal in failed earlier draft 
bill to exempt contracts awarded by public bidding). 
514 ROYAL AMERICAN GAZETTE (New York), July 23, 1782, at 2; see also 14 TOWN 
AND COUNTRY MAGAZINE 477–78 (London, A. Hamilton 1782). 
515 ROYAL AMERICAN GAZETTE (New York), July 23, 1782, at 2; see also 14 TOWN 
AND COUNTRY MAGAZINE 477–78 (London, A. Hamilton 1782). 
516 ROYAL AMERICAN GAZETTE (New York), July 23, 1782, at 2; see also 14 TOWN 
AND COUNTRY MAGAZINE 477 (London, A. Hamilton 1782). 
517 An Act for Restraining any Person Concerned in Any Contract, Commission or 
Agreement Made for the Publick Service from Being Elected or Sitting and Voting as 
a Member of the House of Commons, 22 Geo. 3 c. 45, § 1 (1782). 
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administrator, devisee, executor, or legatee.518  The act required 
every government contract to contain an express condition 
forbidding the admission of any member of the House of Commons 
to it or to any of its benefits.519  It provided only one exception, 
where a member benefitted indirectly through certain companies 
and the contract was made “for the general benefit of such 
incorporation or company.”520 
The act’s remedial provisions were draconian.  They voided 
the seat of any member who violated the act.521  They penalized 
violators the equivalent of one hundred thousand dollars per day 
of improperly sitting in Parliament, plus costs,522 and disqualified 
violators from ever receiving any “emolument” of a government 
contract in the future.523  They fined the government’s signatory 
the equivalent of one hundred thousand dollars plus costs.524  
Finally, the act created a private right of action with monetary 
bounties and no standing requirement in order to enforce its 
provisions.525 
Eighteenth-century appeals to the public trust principle were 
broad.  As one noted British economist wrote in 1772, people are 
“apt to be blinded” by self-interest and willing to sacrifice the 
public good to their own benefit; therefore “in all questions that 
come before” legislatures, “it is absolutely necessary” that “no 
member should have any private advantage or emolument, to get 
or to lose, by his being for or against either side of the question.”526 
The solicitude that critics of the Contractor’s Act showed to 
members of the House of Commons demonstrates that elected 
representatives pose a special risk.  As another mid-century 
 
518 Id. at §§ 4–6. The act allowed grace periods for members to renounce the 
benefits of such contracts. Id. 
519 Id. at § 10. 
520 Id. at § 3 (incorporated trading companies and other companies with more than 
ten members). 
521 Id. at §§ 1–2.  
522 See id. at § 9 (five hundred pounds per day plus costs). The current value of 
five hundred pounds is approximately one hundred thousand dollars. See BANK OF 
ENGLAND, Inflation Calculator, https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/monetary-policy/ 
inflation/inflation-calculator (last visited Oct. 20, 2019) (£500 inflation adjusted from 
1782 to 2018 equals £82,895.52); BANK OF ENGLAND, Daily Spot Exchange Rates 
Against Sterling, https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/boeapps/database/Rates.asp?TD= 
17&TM=Oct&TY=2019&into=GBP&rateview=D (last visited Oct. 20, 2019) (spot 
exchange rate $1.2062 per £1.00). 
523 22 Geo. 3 c. 45, § 9 (1782).  
524 See id. at § 10 (five hundred pounds plus costs). 
525 See id. at §§ 9–10. 
526 MORTIMER, supra note 207, at 316. 
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author observed, abuses by monarchs are easily seen, but those by 
elected representatives are not; people are generally deluded by 
the supposition that their elected representatives will act for the 
common good.527 
The British proposal had the potential to profoundly affect the 
prosecution of the war against the United States.  Americans 
followed it closely.  The press reported the bill’s purpose and 
progress.528  John Adams received updates from Europe on its 
progress, the effects of a change in the British administration on 
the likelihood of enactment, and even the positions of individual 
members of the House of Lords on the bill.529  A prominent 1786 
history of the war noted the importance of the Contractor’s Act and 
the debates on it.530 
 
527 See JOHN SHEBBEARE, A SECOND LETTER TO THE PEOPLE OF ENGLAND ON 
FOREIGN SUBSIDIES, SUBSIDIARY ARMIES, AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES TO THIS NATION 
14–15 (London, J. Scott 1755); cf. id. at 15 (attacking laws that “violate the 
Constitution, create Inequality in the Course of distributive Justice, pillage the many 
to inrich the few, . . . sacrifice the public Good to private Emoluments, and English 
Property to Foreign Interest”). Similarly, opponents of the Alien and Sedition Acts 
insinuated in 1798 that Federalists were closeted monarchists “distributing 
emolument among devoted partizans . . . and deluding the people with professions of 
republicanism.” ELLIOT, supra note 396, at 557. 
528 See, e.g., Contractors Bill, ROYAL AMERICAN GAZETTE (New York), July 23, 
1782, at 1; Contractors Bill, ROYAL GAZETTE (New York), Aug. 21, 1782, at 1; 
Continuation of the Contractors Bill from our Last, ROYAL GAZETTE (New York), Aug. 
24, 1782, at 1; The Speech of the Right Hon Charls James Fox, at a General Meeting 
of the Electors of Westminster, THE NEW-YORK GAZETTEER, OR, NORTHERN 
INTELLIGENCER (Albany, N.Y.), Oct. 28, 1782, at 1. 
529 See, e.g., Edmund Jenings, To John Adams from Edmund Jenings, NAT’L 
ARCHIVES (Apr. 24, 1780), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/06-09-02-
0127 (discussing Contractor’s Bill and enclosing newspaper report of the debates in 
the House of Lords); Edmund Jenings, To John Adams from Edmund Jenings, NAT’L 
ARCHIVES (Mar. 31, 1782), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/06-12-02-
0233 (discussing likelihood of enactment under new British administration); Edmund 
Jenings, To John Adams from Edmund Jenings, NAT’L ARCHIVES (May 16, 1782), 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/06-13-02-0022 (discussing positions 
of several members of the House of Lords on the bill).  
530 See 3 JOHN ANDREWS, HISTORY OF THE WAR WITH AMERICA, FRANCE, SPAIN, 
AND HOLLAND; COMMENCING IN 1775 AND ENDING IN 1783, at 392–94 (London,  
John Fielding 1786). For American awareness of Andrews’s work generally, see 
François Soulés, To Thomas Jefferson from François Soulés, NAT’L ARCHIVES (Sept. 
11, 1786) https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-10-02-0249 (questions 
regarding other parts of Andrews’s History), Thomas Jefferson, II. Answers to Soulés’ 
Queries, NAT’L ARCHIVES (Sept. 13–18, 1786), https://founders.archives.gov/ 
documents/Jefferson/01-10-02-0257-0003; Abigail Adams, Letter from Abigail Adams 
to Mary Smith Cranch, NAT’L ARCHIVES (Sept. 12, 1786), https://founders.archives. 
gov/documents/Adams/04-07-02-0127 (advising that she had sent a copy of Andrews’s 
History to Cranch). 
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Other Americans and British were well aware of the 
connection between conflicts of interest and the ravages of war.  
An American loyalist was accused in 1779 of lengthening the 
Revolutionary war for his own emolument.531  The 1776 
constitutions of Delaware,532 Maryland,533 and North Carolina534 
forbade military contractors to hold important governmental 
positions.  A British critic charged members of Parliament around 
1780 with betraying the people by making “private contracts for 
themselves” like “human pelicans, who feed upon the breast which 
nourished them into being . . . . War is produced and encouraged 
for the support of private emolument.  Thus,—for personal 
contracts, social lives and treasures are sacrificed.”535  And in 1792, 
Alexander Hamilton noted suspicions of villainous “prostitution 
and corruption in office” and “of the horrid depravity of promoting 
wars and the shedding of human blood for the sake of sharing 
collusively in the emoluments of lucrative contracts.”536 
It is profoundly disturbing even to suggest that the Domestic 
Emoluments Clause allows the commander in chief to receive the 
emoluments of military contracts, honest or not, when prosecuting 
wars that shed the blood of armed forces and civilians throughout 
the world. 
Americans were also well aware of the more general threat 
that conflicts of interest from business transactions posed.  A 
Pennsylvanian advocated legislation in 1787 forbidding the county 
treasurer to operate a mercantile business while in office to stop 
him from trading with the government and using “public monies 
for his own particular emolument . . . like a prostituted judge 
sitting arbitrarily in his own cause.”537  He argued that nothing 
 
531 See Letter to the Editor from A.B., ROYAL GAZETTE (New York), Dec. 4, 1779, 
at 3 (disputing the claim). 
532 See DEL. CONST., art. 18 (1776), reprinted in THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE 
SEVERAL INDEPENDENT STATES OF AMERICA 227 (London, 2d ed. 1783) (excluded from 
both Houses of Assembly). 
533 See MD. CONST., § 37 (1776), reprinted in THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE SEVERAL 
INDEPENDENT STATES OF AMERICA 267 (London, 2d ed. 1783) (excluded from General 
Assembly and State Council). 
534 See N.C. CONST., art. 27 (1776), reprinted in THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE 
SEVERAL INDEPENDENT STATES OF AMERICA 307 (London, 2d ed. 1783) (excluded from 
Senate, House of Commons, and Council of State). 
535 ANON., supra note 388, at 29. 
536 See Alexander Hamilton, The Vindication No. I, NAT’L ARCHIVES (May–Aug. 
1792) https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-11-02-0376 (denying 
those suspicions in the case of the American government). 
537 Manlius, Letter to Messieurs Hall and Sellers, PENNSYLVANIA GAZETTE (June 
20, 1787). 
2019]	 EVALUATING	ORIGINALISM:	COMMERCE	AND	EMOLUMENTS	 753	
seems more incompatible with our government than to allow the 
holder of an office “to subvert and apply it to the abhorrent 
purposes of self-interest and private gratification.”538 
Two years later, Congress imposed just such a broad 
prohibition in the Treasury Act, demonstrating an even more 
radical desire to eliminate conflicts of interest from honest 
business activities than Parliament’s.  The act provided broadly: 
That no person appointed to any office instituted by this act, shall 
directly or indirectly be concerned or interested in carrying on the 
business of trade or commerce, or be owner in whole or in part of 
any sea-vessel, or purchase by himself, or another in trust for 
him, any public lands or other public property, or be concerned in 
the purchase or disposal of any public securities of any State, or 
of the United States . . . .539 
The statute fined violators the equivalent of approximately 
forty-five thousand dollars540 and gave half as a bounty to those 
whose information led to a conviction.541  The public provisions and 
trading statutes of 1795,542 1796,543 and 1806544 discussed above545 
included similar provisions, although they post-date Natelson’s 
1790 cutoff.  In addition to imposing duties of good faith, these 
statutes represent early exercises of the power to prohibit 
commerce, including domestic commerce. 
A final example from 1808 rounds out the reform movement, 
although it also post-dates Natelson’s cutoff.  The Congressional 
Emoluments Clause does not forbid members of Congress to 
benefit from contracts with the federal government.  Congress and 
President Jefferson remedied that omission in 1808 with “An Act 
 
538 See id. 
539 See An Act to Establish the Treasury Department, ch. 12, § 8, 1 Stat. 65,  
67 (1789).  
540 See id. (three thousand dollar fine); Morgan Friedman, The Inflation 
Calculator, WESTEGG.COM, https://westegg.com/inflation/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2019) 
(calculating from 1800 to 2018, the earliest and latest dates available). 
541 See An Act to Establish the Treasury Department, ch. 12, § 8, 1 Stat. 65,  
67 (1789). 
542 See An Act to Establish the Office of Purveyor of Public Supplies, ch. 27, § 2, 2 
Stat. 419 (1795). 
543 See An Act for Establishing Trading Houses with the Indian Tribes, ch. 13, 
§§ 1, 3, 1 Stat. 452 (1796). The interaction of these two sections of the act could be 
interpreted only to prohibit trading with the Indian tribes for one’s own account. 
544 See An Act for Establishing Trading Houses with the Indian Tribes, ch. 48, 
§§ 2, 5, 6, 1 Stat. 402 (1806). 
545 See supra notes 405–409 and accompanying text. 
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concerning public contracts” (the “Public Contracts Act”).546  The 
main text broadly mirrors that of the British Contractor’s Act.  It 
provides in part: 
That from and after the passage of this act, no member of 
Congress shall, directly or indirectly, himself, or by any other 
person whatsoever, in trust for him, or for his use or benefit, or 
on his account, undertake, execute, hold or enjoy, in the whole or 
in part, any contract or agreement hereafter to be made or 
entered into with any officer of the United States, in their behalf, 
or with any person authorized to make contracts on the part of 
the United States . . . .547 
The Public Contracts Act was also radical.  It voided any 
contract that violated its terms.548  It made violations high 
misdemeanors for the member of Congress and the federal officer 
who made the contract, with a fine equivalent to approximately 
forty-five thousand dollars.549 
Also similar to the Contractor’s Act, it provides “[t]hat in every 
such contract or agreement to be made or entered into, or accepted 
as aforesaid, there shall be inserted an express condition that no 
member of Congress shall be admitted to any share or part of such 
contract or agreement, or to any benefit to arise thereupon.”550  
This statute, as amended, remains in force today.551  Thus, one can 
draw a direct line from the prohibitions in the Contractor’s Act 
through the Emoluments Clauses and the Public Contracts Act to 






546 An Act Concerning Public Contracts, ch. 48, 1 Stat. 484 (1808). For a general 
description of the act, its legislative history and continuing impact, see Patricia H. 
Wittie, Origins and History of Competition Requirements in Federal Government 
Contracting: There’s Nothing New Under the Sun 5–6, REED SMITH, 
https://www.reedsmith.com/-/media/files/perspectives/2003/02/origins-and-history-of-
competition-requirements-in/files/origins-and-history-of-competition-requirements-
in/fileattachment/wittiepaper.pdf (last visited Oct. 21, 2019). 
547 An Act Concerning Public Contracts, ch. 48, § 1, 1 Stat. 484 (1808). The act had 
two limited exceptions, for certain bills of exchange and for contracts with 
corporations that were made for the general benefit of the corporation. See id. at § 2. 
548 Id. at § 1. 
549 Id. (members of Congress, with a $3,000 fine); id. at § 4 (federal officer, with a 
$3,000 fine); Friedman, supra note 540 ($3,000 in 1808 worth approximately 
forty-seven thousand dollars in 2018).  
550 See An Act Concerning Public Contracts, ch. 48, § 3, 1 Stat. 484 (1808). 
551 See 18 U.S.C. § 431 (2018). 
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Hotel that no “elected official of the Government . . . shall be 
admitted to share any part of this Lease, or any benefit that may 
arise therefrom.”552 
Unsurprisingly, the debates over the Public Contracts Act 
were similar to those over the British Contractor’s Act.  
Representative Holland opposed the proposal, “saying it 
disfranchised members of Congress of the right of making public 
contracts, and enjoying the benefit of them, in common with other 
citizens.”553  Representative Rowan considered the proposal to be 
“an unconstitutional, needless, and ineffectual restraint on the 
liberty of the citizen.”554  Representative Alston invited proponents 
to “lay aside their phrenzy in purifying the House,” arguing that 
the proposal served no purpose.555  “He wished gentlemen would 
give up this parade about purifying the House—this noise about 
fraud and corruption.”556 
On the other hand, Representative Troup supported the 
proposal because “in the event of war, a majority of this House 
might be composed of contractors under Executive influence, 
whose interest it might be to perpetuate the war, and the evils of 
whose conduct might not be corrected without a resort to first 
principles.”557  Representative Clay urged enactment, saying that 
“he would purge the House of Executive influence by positive law, 
otherwise, they might see the time when contracts would be 
offered to members to destroy their independence and engage 
them in the indiscriminate support of a corrupt Administration.”558  
Directly addressing British practice, Representative Troup argued 
that if the proposal were not enacted, “the time is not far distant 





552 See Jessica Taylor & Peter Overby, Federal Watchdog Finds Government 
Ignored Emoluments Clause with Trump Hotel, NPR (Jan. 16, 2019), https://www.npr. 
org/2019/01/16/685977471/federal-watchdog-finds-government-ignored-emoluments-
clause-with-trump-hotel. 
553 18 UNITED STATES, THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE CONGRESS OF THE 
UNITED STATES 1618 (Washington, Gales & Seaton 1852) (debate on Feb. 16, 1808). 
554 Id. at 1716. 
555 Id. For references to “phrenzy” and “purifying” the House of Commons in the 
debates over the Contractor’s Act, see supra notes 485–486 and accompanying text. 
556 UNITED STATES, supra note 553, at 1716. 
557 Id. For the British enactment of the Contractor’s Act to stop the same practice 
during the American war, see supra notes 506–509 and accompanying text. 
558 UNITED STATES, supra note 553, at 1717. 
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are, a corrupt, servile, dependent, and contemptible body.  We had 
better have no Legislature, than one composed of contractors, 
placemen, and pensioners.”559 
Natelson’s work calls to mind the Protestant critique of 
religious interpretation.  Exposition beyond the text is a process of 
human invention that “a discreet Man may do well,” but the result 
is “his scripture, not the Holy Ghost’s.”560  There certainly were 
period uses of “emoluments” that involved setting the 
compensation of officeholders.  But period authorities that limited 
or prohibited the receipt of emoluments functioned broadly to 
reach benefits of business transactions in order to enforce a strong 
principle of good faith in the use of public funds and in the exercise 
of governmental powers. 
Moreover, Natelson may not have consciously used his own 
norms to identify and balance the five values, but the result 
certainly reflects a political morality weighted toward private 
enterprise that is inconsistent with the British and American 
reform movements.  Whether it is possible to apply a pluralist 
method of legal interpretation to determine law as a social fact561 
without reference to one’s own norms is questionable.  Whether 
that method would accurately describe founding-era 
Anglo-American legal practice is also questionable. 
3. Corpus Linguistics Approaches 
Clark D. Cunningham and Jesse Egbert conducted a corpus 
linguistics analysis of “emolument” by applying big data 
techniques to the nearly one hundred thousand texts in the Corpus 
of Founding Era American English (“COFEA”).562  They considered 
every text in which “emolument” appeared, analyzed them using 
three different methods, and concluded that there was no evidence 




559 Id. at 1618. For a brief discussion of ministerial influence through placemen 
and Parliament’s failed attempt to exclude them by the Act of Settlement, see Foord, 
supra note 477, at 497–99. 
560 JOHN SELDEN, TABLE-TALK: BEING THE DISCOURSES OF JOHN SELDEN, ESQ. 
112 (London, Israel Gollancz M.A. ed., 1689), cited by Powell, supra note 1, at 889–90 
(citing 1699 edition). 
561 Cf. Sachs, supra note 13, at 833 (“[I]t’s still possible that social facts ultimately 
provide the answer, and that this answer supports the originalist view.”).  
562 See Cunningham & Egbert, supra note 193, at 1. 
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office or employ.563  Rather, “emoluments” was consistently used 
with a broad and inclusive meaning that was narrowed as required 
in context by modifiers such as “private” or “official.”564 
James Cleith Phillips and Sara White conducted another 
corpus linguistics analysis using a subset of three of the COFEA 
corpora.565  They concluded “that the Congressional and 
Presidential Emoluments Clauses would have most likely been 
understood to contain a narrow, office or public-employment sense 
of ‘emolument.’  But the Foreign Emoluments Clause is more 
ambiguous given the modifying language ‘of any kind whatever’ 
attached to it.”566 
Corpus linguistics cannot be scientific if two sets of 
researchers come to diametrically opposite conclusions from 
analyzing the same three corpora;567 one finding no evidence of the 
narrow meaning in any of the Emoluments Clauses, and the other 
finding that two of the Clauses most likely have the narrow 
meaning and that the third might have it as well.  Indeed, both 
teams acknowledge that they relied on qualitative analyses.568  
Phillips and White further explain that “the heart of corpus 
linguistic analysis—what in our view is the aspect of the 
methodology that provides the most valuable information—is the 
most qualitative and is really no different than reading a sample 
of cases one has found from a computerized search of a legal 
database.”569  Corpus linguistic analysis of the Constitution is just 




563 See id. at 2. 
564 See id. at 2, 9–14. 
565 See James Cleith Phillips & Sara White, The Meaning of the Three 
Emoluments Clauses in the U.S. Constitution: A Corpus Linguistic Analysis of 
American English From 1760–1799, 59 S. TEX. L. REV. 181, 203 (2017) (examining the 
Evans Early American Imprint Series, Founders Online, and Hein Online); 
Cunningham & Egbert, supra note 193, at 6 (noting that COFEA consists of six 
sources, including Evans, Founders Online, and Hein Online). 
566 See Phillips & White, supra note 565, at 233–34. 
567 The scientific method requires that different teams can obtain a given 
measurement with a given precision using the same experimental setup (replicability) 
or a different experimental setup (reproducibility). See Hans E. Plesser, 
Reproducibility vs. Replicability: A Brief History of a Confused Terminology, 
FRONTIERS IN NEUROINFORMATICS (Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.frontiersin.org/ 
articles/10.3389/fninf.2017.00076/full.  
568 See Phillips & White, supra note 565, at 233; Cunningham & Egbert, supra 
note 193, at 8. 
569 See Phillips & White, supra note 565, at 233. 
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authentic and objective semantic constitutional meaning 
communicated from the past.  The two teams’ interpretations are 
their own subjective opinions. 
VII. IMPLICATIONS FOR ORIGINALISM 
A. Implications of Context 
The shift from dictionary definitions to broader context and 
eighteenth-century corpora only increases the possible meanings 
of constitutional text.  Context shows multiple inconsistent public 
meanings, as corpus linguistics confirms.570  One cannot determine 
an original public meaning by any objective factual standard like 
counting usage votes, any more than one can do so by counting 
dictionary votes or intention votes. 
Context might suggest multiple meanings for a single word in 
the same constitutional clause, as Barnett asserts of “regulate” 
within the Commerce Clause;571 a single meaning for a multiple 
word term, as Tillman asserts of “office under” in the Domestic 
Emoluments Clause;572 and the same meaning for different words 
and different multiple word terms, as Barnett asserts of “trade,” 
“commerce,” “trade and commerce,” and “trade or commerce.”573  
Context can blunt seemingly comprehensive descriptions of a 
term’s reach, as in Hoyt.  Context can also explain an absence of 
recorded public usage.  Things might be so well known that they 
do not require any reference in context.  Other things might be too 
well known even to set out.  Samuel Johnson explained that “such 
is the fate of hapless lexicography, that not only darkness, but 
light, impedes and distresses it; things may be not only too little, 
but too much known, to be happily illustrated.”574  Uses are facts 
in the world.  Constitutional meanings are not.  There are multiple 






570 Cf. Blackman & Phillips, supra note 188 (applying corpus linguistics to the 
Second Amendment “leads to potentially uncomfortable criticisms for” prior original 
public meaning opinions, although the authors do not reach a conclusion on the result 
corpus linguistics might generate). 
571 See supra notes 267–272 and accompanying text. 
572 See supra note 309 and accompanying text. 
573 See supra note 198 and accompanying text. 
574 JOHNSON, supra note 173 (fifth preface page). 
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above, and none can emerge objectively from the corpus  
of eighteenth-century usage as a factual, communicated 
constitutional meaning.575 
This is particularly true when context includes competing 
principles of political morality.  Where interpretation depends on 
identifying and balancing underlying constitutional principles and 
characterizing some duties as fundamental, meaning cannot exist 
as a historical fact.  Where context includes (1) the deal one thinks 
that the drafters and ratifiers struck, and (2) a judgment about 
which duties are actually fundamental, there cannot be a 
non-normative original public meaning of constitutional text.  The 
interpreter must choose.  As Benjamin Franklin recognized, 
“[s]uch is the imperfection of our language, and perhaps of all 
other languages, that, notwithstanding we are furnished with 
dictionaries innumerable, we cannot precisely know the import of 
words, unless we know of what party the man is that uses them.”576  
By choosing and balancing underlying principles and fundamental 
duties, the interpreter determines of what party the Constitution 
is and thereby what it means. 
B. Pre-interpretive Commitments 
Tillman includes general British law as relevant context for 
interpreting the Constitution.  Natelson goes further and includes 
specific British statutes as relevant.  The Constitution is not an 
independent charter,577 but rather part of a long Anglo-American 
legal tradition.  This is a normative pre-interpretive assumption.  
The Supreme Court has held that known legal terms used in the 
Constitution take their common law meanings,578 but that rule  
is not in the Constitution.  It is a post-ratification interpretation 





575 Cf. Lawrence M. Solan, Can Corpus Linguistics Help Make Originalism 
Scientific?, 126 YALE L.J. F. 57, 57 (May 27, 2016). 
576 FRANKLIN, supra note 143, at 318. 
577 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution . . . shall be the supreme Law 
of the Land”). 
578 See, e.g., Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 167–68 (1874); United 
States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 654 (1898). 
579 See, e.g., BARNETT, supra note 13, at 137 (disputing early Supreme Court 
interpretation of reach of “commerce”). 
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Moreover, Tillman’s and Natelson’s approaches require 
taking a pre-interpretive position on the extent of America’s 
separation from Britain.580  Was the American Revolution truly a 
revolution, or merely a continuation of the English and British 
systems except as specifically changed by express constitutional 
terms?  Did Americans rebel to create a new government, or 
merely separate in order to guarantee the rights of English that 
they believed they deserved, including the right not to pay taxes 
without representation?  How are we to determine whether to rely 
on general American usage for words like “office” and “under” 
rather than British legal usage?  Should we use legal or ordinary 
dictionaries?  Which usage governs when words like “emoluments” 
exist in the popular as well as legal press, particularly where the 
same variety of usage appears in both? 
Is the analogy to British law relevant where the U.S. system 
differs from the British system?  The Constitution uses the English 
legal term “natural born,” for example, and some deny that the 
constitutional definition mirrors the English one because the 
United States threw off a monarchical government and 
established a different, republican form of government.581  Britain 
did not have a separately elected executive branch.  Might this 
make British law irrelevant to executive offices described in the 
Constitution?  Ellesmere rejected reliance on Plato and Aristotle 
in judging Calvin’s Case because they lived in a popular state and 
were enemies of monarchies.582  Consequently, their opinions “are 
no canons to give lawes to kinges and kingdomes, no more than sir 
Thomas Moores Vtopia, or such pamphlets as wee haue at euerie  
 
 
580 See, e.g., Michael D. Ramsey, Beyond the Text: Justice Scalia’s Originalism in 
Practice, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1945, 1952 et seq. (2017); id. at 1957 (“His reliance 
[on background English law] . . . assumes a linguistic and conceptual continuity 
between the framing and the English-law background (something not obvious in a 
revolutionary context).”). Natelson’s position reflects significant historical research. 
See, e.g., Robert G. Natelson, The Founders’ Hermeneutic: The Real Original 
Understanding of Original Intent, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1239, 1246–49 (2007). 
581 See, e.g., United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 709 (1898) (Fuller, 
C.J., dissenting) (“Manifestly, when the sovereignty of the crown was thrown off, and 
an independent government established, every rule of the common law, and every 
statute of England obtaining in the Colonies, in derogation of the principles on which 
the new government was founded, was abrogated.”); Thomas H. Lee, "Natural Born 
Citizen”, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 327, 389–92 (2017) (definition of "natural born Citizen" is 
a combination of English law and natural law in part because of the change from a 
monarchical to a republican form of government). 
582 ELLESMERE, supra note 48, at 692. 
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marte.”583  Should canons of English or British monarchical 
government provide any more meaning to the Constitution than 
Moore’s Utopia? 
If the use of “office under” imports the British meaning of the 
term, does it also import the same roles, powers, and obligations 
of British offices?  If usage in the Contractor’s Act exports a 
meaning of “emoluments,” does it also export substantive 
provisions such as private rights of action?  Does it export an 
exception for indirect benefits of government contracts received in 
limited cases through investments in private companies?  Or does 
the Foreign Emoluments Clause’s prohibition of emoluments “of 
any kind whatever” and the Domestic Emoluments Clause’s 
prohibition of “any other” emoluments block the importation of 
that exception? 
These are only a few of the pre- or meta-interpretive choices 
that ground constitutional interpretation and undermine 
communicative originalism’s claim to non-normative historical 
authenticity.  Others include: (1) whether the Constitution created 
a federal government of the people or a compact among several 
sovereign states;584 (2) whether the enumerated congressional 
powers are exclusive or can be supplemented;585 (3) whether the 
scope of “commerce” is limited to a specific meaning or structurally 
empowers Congress to create solutions to national problems that 
the states do not address;586 (4) what are the scopes and relative 
priorities of legislative and executive powers;587 (5) what is the 
scope and constitutionality of judicial review;588 (6) what principles 
underlie the Constitution, and which of those are top-tier;589 
(7) which obligations of citizenship are fundamental;590 and 
(8) how to resolve doubtful cases.591 
 
583 Id. 
584 See D. A. Jeremy Telman, All That Is Liquidated Melts Into Air: Five Meta-





589 See, e.g., Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 
341, 342 (2009).  
590 See supra note 277 and accompanying text.  
591 See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 
FORDHAM L. REV. 453, 487–88 (2013) (strict construction, deference to political 
branches, purposive construction, and structural construction); James Madison, From 
James Madison to Edward Coles, NAT’L ARCHIVES (May 23, 1823), https://founders. 
archives.gov/documents/Madison/04-03-02-0055 (“I am no friend to forced or strained 
constructions of a Constitution for enlarging power . . . . But where the object is 
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C. Essentialism Versus Conventionalism 
Originalists face the same recurring conflict between 
essentialist and conventionalist approaches to linguistic meaning 
as Renaissance jurists.  Both approaches are problematic for legal 
interpretation.592  One holds that words “contain in some sense the 
essence of what they designate,” possessing a “communicative 
function” that causes people “to attribute substantiae to them.”593  
This presumes a scientific certainty for the meanings of words that 
is both dangerous for legal interpretation and inconsistent with 
actual legal practice.594  The other approach holds that words’ 
meanings are entirely conventional, which “threatens to unhitch 
[words] from their attachments to the real world, and puts in 
jeopardy . . . the possibility of acceding to proprietas verborum 
[propriety of words].”595 
Was insurance “commerce” in the eighteenth century because 
authors called it commerce?  Or did authors call insurance 
commerce because it was commerce?  If the first author to call 
insurance “commerce” happened to write in the nineteenth 
century, would we conclude that insurance became commerce 
then, so that the Commerce Clause does not reach it?  Or would 
we conclude that insurance actually was commerce all along, so 
that Congress’s power reaches it? 
Many would conclude the latter.  One eighteenth-century 
author, for example, explained insurance not to change its 
definition, but rather to cast new light on the subject; he dedicated 
the work to a prominent authority to appeal to his judgment of 
what “the science of insurance” actually was, not to ask for the 
arbitrary imposition of the author’s views on the nation: 
Your superior Skill in the Commerce of your Country, fixes every 
Essay of this sort under your Dominion.—For though your high 
Station gives you a Power, you derive from your Abilities an 
Authority much greater, over these Subjects.  A Work, therefore, 
which pretends to bring new Light upon Objects of Trade, and to 
rectify the Course of Business, is justly to pay its Homage to You; 
And it is from your Decision upon it, that the World will be  
 
 
indisputably, the public Good, and certainly within the policy of the Constitutional 
provision, a less strict rule of interpretation must be admitted.”). 
592 MACLEAN, supra note 89, at 110–11. 
593 Id. 
594 See, e.g., id. at 107-09. 
595 Id. at 111. 
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instructed to form their Sentiments.—For so just is the public 
Deference, that it would unanimously have constituted YOU the 
Judge, if you had not condescended to be the Patron . . . .596 
One can conclude that the Emoluments Clauses reach  
honest contracts with governments without having to rely on 
essentialism, conventionalism, proper definitions from the 
founding era, or definitions by designation of a myriad of 
founding-era uses.  Even if the Contractor’s Act and debates 
surrounding it occurred after the adoption of the Constitution, an 
interpreter could reasonably conclude that the Clauses reach 
honest business transactions with government.  As Aquinas 
counsels, we must determine the meaning to which words are put.  
The Emoluments Clauses forbid “emoluments” under a public 
trust principle that is strong enough to reach those transactions 
and to outweigh the top-tier value of decentralization/federalism. 
As many point out, for “concepts such as ‘abridging the 
freedom of speech,’ which we are likely to encounter in the 
constitutional context, it is unclear whether the original meaning 
ought to be interpreted thickly to include specific examples of the 
concept or thinly to define only the concept itself.”597  This is as 
true of superficially non-normative concepts like commerce and 
emoluments as of normative concepts like freedom of speech, equal 
protection, and due process.  Originalists might specify their 
choice of breadth of relevant context, fundamental principles, 
deals that they believe were struck, and the like.  But these choices 
are arbitrary and anachronistic, imposed upon the text and public 
usage by the interpreter.  They cannot determine a non-normative 
historical fact about the communicated meaning of the text  
from which even prima facie constitutional rights or obligations 
can derive. 
D. Burden of Proof and Default Rules 
Some argue that one can determine the original public 
meaning of constitutional text by setting an appropriately low 
burden of proof598 and stipulating default interpretive rules to 
constrain judicial discretion when founding-era evidence does not 
 
596 MORRIS CORBYN, AN ESSAY TOWARDS ILLUSTRATING THE SCIENCE OF 
INSURANCE iv (London, 1747).  
597 See, e.g., Solan, supra note 575, at 57.  
598 See, e.g., Lawson & Seidman, supra note 29, at 54 n.23 (the only normative 
element of legal interpretation is “the standard of proof that one employs”). 
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meet that threshold.599  But one cannot find something that does 
not exist by lowering the burden of proof, and adopting any default 
interpretive rule is a normative decision.  One could stipulate a 
method of interpretation that references historical sources, such 
as stipulating that meaning is determined word-by-word, without 
combining any words into phrases, with each word’s meaning 
taken from the greatest number of consistent dictionary 
definitions found in print in 1789.  That would yield a historically 
restricted interpretation, but it would not determine as a matter 
of fact the original public meaning of the Constitution’s text, nor 
would it identify even prima facie normative constitutional rights 
and obligations.  Stipulated definitions, whatever they are, or the 
burden of proof, or default rules used to determine their results, 
are not original public meanings communicated to us from the 
past.  They are merely stipulations.  A stipulated method might 
function to restrict judicial discretion—although it might not—but 
that is a normative objective that must be justified independently 
of any historical facts. 
CONCLUSION 
Originalism is a family of legal theories that share a core focus 
on history and an aversion to allowing judges the discretion to 
apply contemporary or personal values when interpreting the 
Constitution.  American originalism first asked what the founders, 
drafters, or ratifiers intended.  In the face of criticism, it evolved 
to ask how the American public understood the Constitution’s 
words.  This Article shows that public understandings of terms in 
the Commerce Clause were broad, reaching commercial activities 
like insurance, agriculture and manufacturing, and both 
prohibiting and commanding those activities.  It also shows that 
public understandings of terms in the Emoluments Clauses 
reached elected officials and the benefits of business transactions 
with governments.  Anglo-American legal history proximate to the 
adoption of the Constitution is consistent with a broad 
interpretation of the Emoluments Clauses to prevent conflicts of 
interest, ensure the independence of elected officials, and secure 
the survival of representative government.   
 
 
599 See, e.g., Tillman, supra note 312, at 54–55 (describing without subscribing to 
the approach). 
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The originalist interpretations of the Commerce and 
Emoluments Clauses discussed above do not identify 
non-normative, historically accurate communicated meanings 
from the past to the contemporary interpreter.  They ultimately 
rely on normative judgments.  Communicative originalism 
continues to face the same challenges that Renaissance civil 
lawyers and the English novelists faced. 
In light of continuing criticism, originalism is evolving yet 
again to ask what we should make of the Constitution by applying 
traditional methods of legal analysis to constitutional text, history, 
and political morality.  The latest evolution of originalism 
forthrightly embraces legal methodology as the correct way to 
interpret the Constitution.  Whether this iteration will be any 
more successful than its predecessors remains to be seen.  If it is 
not, then another will likely take its place.  Originalism is 
ultimately a normative aspiration embraced by many who hope, 
like Fichard, that Emperor Justinian’s ideal of a self-sufficient and 
historically-determined legal system will yet come to pass. 
